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INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 1787, in the course of a lengthy debate in the
Constitutional Convention over whether the president ought to
be subject to impeachment, Benjamin Franklin made a remarkable argument in the affirmative.
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History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this in cases where the chief
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It wd. be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the
Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.1

That is, Franklin, recognizing that presidents might sometimes
“render [themselves] obnoxious,” recommended a formal, constitutional mechanism for bringing them to justice instead of
what he saw as the inevitable alternative: assassination. Or, to
put it differently, impeachment was an attempt to domesticate,
to tame, assassination.
What are we to make of this claim? I suggest that it can
shed light on one of the more vexing questions surrounding impeachment: just what is an impeachable offense? Some have
suggested that, in the words of then-Congressman Gerald Ford,
“an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of
Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history,” provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.2 But
this sits uncomfortably with the Constitution’s use of the wording “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”3—a phrase that sounds in legal standards.4 Indeed, the
Philadelphia Convention originally considered a draft that
made the president impeachable only “for Treason, or bribery.”5
George Mason complained that, as treason had a strict consti1. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
2. 116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
4. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
90 (enlarged ed. 1974) (“[T]he Framers, far from proposing to confer illimitable
power to impeach and convict, intended to confer a limited power.”); id. at
111–12 (“The last thing intended by the Framers was to leave the Senate free
to declare any conduct whatsoever a ‘high crime and misdemeanor.’”); Frank
Thompson, Jr. & Daniel H. Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges: An Historical Overview, 49 N.C. L. REV. 87, 107 (1970) (noting, after surveying impeachment trials of federal judges, that “Congressman Ford is in error”).
Of course, the fact that there are legal standards for impeachment does
not mean that impeachments are justiciable. See Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993) (holding that impeachments are nonjusticiable); see
also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE
AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 61–
66 (2007) (arguing that Nixon was correctly decided).
5. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499.
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tutional definition,6 an impeachability provision limited to bribery and treason “will not reach many great and dangerous offenses.”7 Accordingly, he proposed adding “maladministration”
as a third category of impeachable offenses.8 James Madison,
however, cautioned that “[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to
a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”9 Mason then withdrew
his proposal to add maladministration and suggested instead
“other high crimes & misdemeanors,” and this proposal was accepted by the Convention.10 Clearly, this new language was
meant to be responsive to Madison’s concern—that is, it was
meant to make it clear that impeachment was to be governed
by legal standards and not by congressional whim.
But what should those standards be? The terms “impeachment” and “high crimes and misdemeanors” are lifted
from English law,11 and this history makes it clear that “high
crimes and misdemeanors” was generally understood as encompassing distinctly political offenses.12 But the history of
English impeachment is of limited utility in discussing American presidential impeachment13 for the simple reason that, at
6. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”).
7. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 550.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See BERGER, supra note 4, at 57–58.
12. See id. at 64; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that impeachable offenses “are
of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL”).
13. As Berger notes, discussion of impeachment at the Founding was focused almost exclusively on executive impeachment. See BERGER, supra note
4, at 96, 106, 146–47, 152–53. This emphasis is further highlighted by the location of the provision making “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States”—including judges—impeachable. It comes in Article II, the article establishing the executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Indeed, the provision originally applied only to the President; the Vice President and other civil officers were added, seemingly as an afterthought, only a
little more than a week before the Convention adjourned. See 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 552.
This Article will therefore follow the Founding generation in focusing on
presidential impeachment. It should be noted, however, that it may make
sense to have different conceptions of what constitute impeachable offenses
when considering the impeachment of Presidents, other executive branch officers, and judges. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT
PROCESS 106–07 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that different impeachability standards
may apply to different types of impeachable officers). This follows not only
from the fact that different sorts of behavior are expected from different sorts
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English law, the Crown was literally unimpeachable.14 The impeachability of the American president thus marks a decisive
break with English practice, and it is this break that explains
the attention given to the issue of presidential impeachability
in both the Philadelphia Convention15 and in the ratification
debates.16 Indeed, Hamilton specifically pointed to presidential
impeachability in order to defend the Constitution from the Anti-Federalist charge that the president would be as powerful as
a king. The person of the British King, Hamilton noted, “is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which
he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national
revolution.”17 Because the impeachability of the chief magistrate was an area in which the American Constitution was
meant to depart from British practice, and because the impeachability of the chief magistrate presents a unique set of issues, potentially justifying a unique substantive standard,18 the
British practice is of limited interpretive utility.19
But this does not mean that we have to throw up our hands
and decide, with Ford,20 that impeachment is lawless. In contrast to Ford, I suggest that, in the context of presidential impeachment, we accept Franklin’s provocative invitation—an invitation that scholars have thus far ignored21—to view
of officeholders, but also from the constitutional uniqueness of the presidency.
After all, a misbehaving judge, or even justice, does not constitute in herself
one of the three coequal branches of government, as the President does. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.” (emphasis added)).
14. See William Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REG. 641,
644 (1867).
15. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 53–54, 64 –69.
16. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 19 (noting that the ratification debates focused on those aspects of impeachment that “looked innovative or novel, such as presidential impeachment”).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 12, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton).
18. See supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
19. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that preconstitutional impeachment practices are largely irrelevant to constitutional impeachment practices “because the framers set forth a special impeachment
mechanism in the Constitution that reflected their intention to differentiate
the newly proposed federal impeachment process from the English and state
experiences with impeachment prior to 1787”).
20. See supra text accompanying note 2.
21. Franklin’s linkage of impeachment and assassination has occasionally
been noted by scholars in passing or as a dramatic aside, but it has never been
unpacked or even taken particularly seriously. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4,
at 104 –05; GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 7–8; Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut:
Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must Be Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 388
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impeachable offenses as (what might otherwise be) assassinable offenses. On this view, impeachment maintains the link between removal and death, but attenuates it. Both impeachment
and assassination deal with a situation in which a chief magistrate has rendered himself too obnoxious to be allowed to continue to rule, but whereas assassination by definition involves
the death of its object, American impeachment never can.22 Impeachment is, instead, a political death—a president who is
impeached and convicted is deprived of his continued existence
as a political officeholder. And, like death, impeachment and
conviction may be permanent.23
These heretofore unexplored connections suggest that assassinability may appropriately provide the substantive criteria
for impeachability. But assassination as a means of executive
removal has significant drawbacks. It is politically disruptive;
it carries a high risk of irreversible error; and it is, of course,
violent. American impeachment tames assassination by, in
Franklin’s word, “regular[izing]”24 it—that is, by proceduralizing it. The Constitution’s impeachment procedures make the
removal of the chief magistrate less violent, less disruptive, and
less error-prone than assassination. Impeachment in the American Constitution is thus a domestication of assassination—
both in the literal sense that it takes a substantive standard
from elsewhere and imports it into domestic law, and in the fig-

(2000); Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex
Scandals, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 704 n.244 (1999); Jonathan Turley,
Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device,
49 DUKE L.J. 1, 138–39 (1999); Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 117, 121 (1998).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment
shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”).
23. See id. (allowing disqualification to future officeholding as a punishment in cases of impeachment).
The language of political death is, of course, metaphorical—and, like all
metaphors, the vehicle does not perfectly fit the tenor. An impeached, convicted, and disqualified officeholder can still hold state office. See id. (limiting
disqualification to “any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States” (emphasis added)). Indeed, an impeached, convicted, and disqualified
officeholder can be elected to Congress. See CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at 280 n.68
(arguing that Senators and Representatives do not hold “Office[s] of honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States”). Still, it is the central contention of
this Article that the vehicle (assassination, death) can shed significant light on
the tenor (impeachment).
24. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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urative sense that it takes executive removal out of the realm
of the brutish and brings it into the realm of the civilized.
These claims, of course, require significantly more elaboration, and that is what the rest of this Article will provide. In the
following pages, I shall attempt to unpack Franklin’s association of impeachment with assassination, using two paradigm
cases25 that Franklin would have had in mind when he uttered
those lines in the Philadelphia Convention, as well as two subsequent cases that shed light on the impeachmentassassination nexus.
The first two Parts argue that Franklin had the assassination of Julius Caesar and the trial and execution of Charles I
centrally in mind when discussing the removal of obnoxious
chief magistrates. Both Caesar and Charles were tyrants who
had subverted their countries’ constitutions in ways that undermined republican liberty, and both had prosecuted bloody
civil wars in the process. Franklin and his compatriots therefore believed that Brutus and his coconspirators were justified
in killing Caesar and that the English regicides were justified
in killing Charles. But substantive justification is not the end
of the story; the lack of procedural regularity attendant upon
both of these political murders posed difficulties for the Founding generation. These Parts, therefore, not only derive a substantive standard for impeachability from the factors justifying
assassination, they also point to the ways in which American
impeachment practice rectifies the procedural flaws evident in
the Roman and English examples.
The third and fourth Parts of this Article trace the interaction of these substantive and procedural criteria at two key
moments in the history of the American presidency. The first
moment, discussed in Part III, includes the assassination of
President Lincoln in 1865 and the impeachment and acquittal
of President Johnson a mere three years later. This Part argues
that both John Wilkes Booth and Johnson’s Radical Republican
opponents in Congress were using the correct substantive standard for removal, but both made mistaken judgments on the
merits: neither Lincoln nor Johnson was, in fact, behaving tyrannically. But while Booth’s unilateral action led to tragic results, the Radical Republicans’ compliance with the proper constitutional procedures led to the correct outcome.
25. On the importance of paradigm cases for constitutional interpretation,
see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 178–95 (2001).
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The second significant moment, examined in Part IV, is the
impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton in 1998–1999.
This Article argues that those favoring impeachment and conviction in this case applied the wrong substantive standard.
They criticized Clinton for “debas[ing]”26 or “defil[ing]”27 the office of the presidency—in effect, for making it too small. But,
the focus on assassinability as the substantive standard for impeachability allows us to see that impeachment is meant to
combat precisely the opposite problem. The paradigmatically
assassinable—and therefore impeachable—chief magistrate is
one who, like Caesar or Charles, seeks to make the office too
big, one who seeks to aggrandize his own power. The Senate
was therefore right to acquit Clinton, and once again, the procedural mechanisms of impeachment worked to produce the
correct result.
The conclusion includes a brief discussion of one American
president who would have met the standard for impeachment
laid out in this Article: Richard Nixon.
I. CAESAR AND BRUTUS
A. FRANKLIN AND CAESAR
When Franklin spoke of executive assassinations, there
can be little doubt that he had the tumultuous world of Roman
politics in mind. After all, Rome loomed large in the minds of
the Founding generation generally,28 as evinced by the pennames chosen by both Anti-Federalists (including Brutus,29 Cato,30 and Agrippa31) and Federalists (including Marcus,32 Mark

26. 145 CONG. REC. 2565 (1999) (statement of Sen. Charles Hagel).
27. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE 5 (1998).
28. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 53 (rev. ed. 1998) (“The nostalgic image of the Roman
Republic became a symbol of all [the patriots’] dissatisfactions with the
present and their hopes for the future.”).
29. See Essays of Brutus, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
358, 358–452 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST].
30. See Letters of Cato, reprinted in 2 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 29, at
101, 101–29.
31. See Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in 4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
29, at 68, 68–116.
32. See Marcus, The Interests of this State, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION 127, 127–28 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter
BAILYN’S DEBATE].
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Antony,33 and, most famously, Publius34). And although the
Founders were familiar with any number of sources on Roman
history, the most influential was unquestionably the firstcentury A.D. biographer Plutarch.35 Franklin himself was certainly a devotee of Plutarch. In his Autobiography, he mentions
that, as a young child, he “read abundantly” in Plutarch’s Lives,
“and I still think that time spent to great Advantage.”36 And
when Franklin founded the Library Company of Philadelphia
in 1731,37 one of the first books he ordered was the Lives.38
Franklin was also intimately familiar with two prominent
dramatic adaptors of stories from Plutarch: Shakespeare39—a
1744 notice in Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette advertised
“SHAKESPEAR’S PLAYS in 8 Vol. neatly bound. Sold by the
Printer hereof”40—and Joseph Addison,41 whose 1713 play Cato
was hugely influential in the colonies generally42 and for
Franklin in particular.43
33. See Mark Antony, Slavery “Ought to Be Regreted . . . But It Is Evidently Beyond Our Controul”: A Defense of the Three-Fifths Clause, reprinted in 1
BAILYN’S DEBATE, supra note 32, at 737, 737–43.
34. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 12.
35. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15 (2008) (“[T]he Framing generation particularly
prized the works of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Polybius, and Plutarch, in
that rising order of esteem.” (emphasis added)); id. at 16 (“Unquestionably the
most influential Greek work in colonial America and the early republic was Plutarch’s Lives and Morals.”); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 (1985) (“Doubtless the most
widely read ancient work [in the early republic] . . . was Plutarch’s Lives.”).
36. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, in THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER WRITINGS 3, 13 (Kenneth Silverman ed., 1986).
37. See WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 103–
04 (2003) (describing the founding of the Library Company of Philadelphia).
38. See Albert J. Edmunds, The First Books Imported by America’s First
Great Library: 1732, 30 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 300, 300 (1906) (listing
“Plutarch’s Lives in Small Vol.” among the first set of books ordered for the
library).
39. On the importance of Plutarch to Shakespeare, see, for example, Vivian Thomas, Shakespeare’s Sources: Translations, Transformations, and Intertextuality in Julius Caesar, in JULIUS CAESAR: NEW CRITICAL ESSAYS 91, 93
(Horst Zander ed., 2005) (“However many tributaries flowed into Shakespeare’s
consciousness, the overriding significance of Plutarch is beyond question.”).
40. Advertisement, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1744, at 3.
41. See Fredric M. Litto, Addison’s Cato in the Colonies, 23 WM. & MARY
Q. 431, 432 n.2 (1966) (“Addison had modeled his Marcus Cato and Julius
Caesar quite clearly after Plutarch’s biographies of them.”).
42. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 54 (1968)
(referring to “Addison’s universally popular play Cato”); id. at 80 (referring to
“that universally popular paean to liberty, Addison’s Cato”); Litto, supra note

2010]

IMPEACHMENT AND ASSASSINATION

355

And central to Plutarch’s Lives—and to Shakespeare’s and
Addison’s oeuvres, as well44—is the assassination of Julius Caesar. Of course, Caesar is hardly the only of Plutarch’s subjects
to be assassinated,45 but he is certainly the most frequently assassinated subject: he meets his death in no fewer than four
Lives.46 (His life, but not his death, also receives extensive
treatment in three other Lives whose subjects predeceased
him.)47 Given the centrality of Plutarch to Franklin and his
contemporaries, and given the centrality of Caesar to Plutarch,
it is inconceivable that Franklin did not have Caesar in mind
when he spoke of the assassination of a “chief Magistrate [who
had] rendered himself obnoxious.”48 It is, therefore, to an examination of the circumstances surrounding that assassination
that we must turn if we are better to understand Franklin’s
meaning. More precisely, it is to an examination of Plutarch’s
presentation of those circumstances, supplemented by their
treatment by Addison and Shakespeare, that this Article now
turns, not because those are the most historically accurate accounts of the relevant events,49 but rather because, as we have

41, at 440–49 (noting the influence of Addison on American patriots in the
late-colonial period, including Franklin).
43. See FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 93–94 (noting that Franklin used a
quote from Addison’s Cato as an epigraph to the famous journal in which he
kept track of his attempt to achieve moral perfection); BENJAMIN FRANKLIN,
PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA (1749),
reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 397, 405–06 (Leonard W.
Labaree ed., 1961) [hereinafter FRANKLIN PAPERS] (listing Addison among the
“Classicks” that should be used to teach English to Pennsylvania youths).
44. See generally JOSEPH ADDISON, Cato: A Tragedy, in CATO: A TRAGEDY,
AND SELECTED ESSAYS 1 (Christine Dunn Henderson & Mark E. Yellin eds.,
2004) (dramatizing Cato’s opposition to Caesar); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
JULIUS CAESAR (Yale Univ. Press ann. ed. 2006) (dramatizing the life and
death of Caesar).
45. See James Atlas, Introduction to 1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES, at
ix, xiv (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden trans., Modern Library 2001)
(“Few of [Plutarch’s] subjects died in their beds; murder . . . was the order of
the day.”). For just a sampling of the Roman assassinations in Plutarch, see
id. at 43 (assassination of Tatius); id. at 321, 324 (assassination of Coriolanus); 2 id. at 21 (assassination of Sertorius); id. at 368–69 (assassination of
Tiberius Gracchus); id. at 440–41 (assassination of Cicero).
46. See 2 id. at 239–42 (life of Caesar); id. at 436 (life of Cicero); id. at
488–89 (life of Antony); id. at 577–83 (life of Brutus).
47. See 1 id. at 734 –35 (life of Crassus); 2 id. at 106–35 (life of Pompey);
id. at 303–17 (life of Cato).
48. See supra text accompanying note 1.
49. They, of course, are not. Addison and Shakespeare (understandably)
took dramatic liberties, and it would be anachronistic to expect Plutarch to

356

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:347

seen above, those were the sources on Caesar that most shaped
Franklin and his contemporaries.
B. CAESAR AND BRUTUS
It is unnecessary to recount here Gaius Julius Caesar’s
early years or his rise to power. It suffices to note that his ascension was swift, rising to the consulship50—Rome’s chief
magistry—in 59 B.C.,51 at roughly the age of 41.52 He was aided
in his rise by his alliance with Crassus and Pompey53 (in what
historians would later call the “First Triumvirate”54) and he
was strenuously opposed by Cato the Younger,55 who repeatedly warned his countrymen that Caesar aimed at tyranny.56 As
consul, he proposed measures meant not only to win popular
support for himself, but also to alienate popular support from
the patricians, who generally opposed him.57
After his year of consulship was over, Caesar left Rome to
become Proconsul of Gaul.58 There, he successfully prosecuted
the wars which were to gain him the reputation as one of the
foremost military strategists in history, conquering much of
Europe for the Republic.59 Caesar’s generalship and generosity
won him a devoted following among his soldiers60 and Caesar
used the spoils of war to “purchas[e] himself numerous
friends.”61 In 56 B.C., the Triumvirate agreed that Pompey and
Crassus were to become consuls and that they were to use their
consular power to extend Caesar’s governorship of Gaul for
another five years.62 As Plutarch notes, “[t]his seemed a plain
conspiracy to subvert the constitution and parcel out the empire” amongst the three of them.63 All other contenders for the
have adhered to twenty-first century historiographical standards. See Atlas,
supra note 45, at xii (“How accurate are these details? Not very.”).
50. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 207.
51. ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY, CAESAR: LIFE OF A COLOSSUS 163–64 (2006).
52. See id. at 30 (giving Caesar’s birthdate as July 13, 100 B.C.).
53. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 107, 207.
54. See, e.g., GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 51, at 164.
55. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 207.
56. See id. at 204, 207, 214 –15, 284 –85, 290–91, 298, 303.
57. See id. at 207–08.
58. See id. at 208.
59. See id. at 209–18.
60. See id. at 209.
61. Id. at 111.
62. Id. at 111, 295.
63. Id. at 296.
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consulship withdrew out of fear, but Cato persuaded his brother-in-law, Lucius Domitius, to contest the consular elections,
telling him that “the contest now is not for office, but for liberty
against tyrants and usurpers.”64 As Domitius was proceeding to
the forum, Pompey’s forces attacked, slaying some of his party
and wounding others (including Cato) and forcing Domitius to
withdraw.65 The Triumvirate thus consolidated its power.
In 54 B.C., Caesar’s daughter Julia, who had married
Pompey as part of the process of cementing the Triumvirate,
died in childbirth.66 The next year, Crassus, who, as soon as his
consulship was over, had departed Rome for a governorship in
Parthia (present-day northeastern Iran), was killed in battle.67
These two deaths irrevocably rent the bonds holding the Triumvirate together—as Plutarch noted, only the fear of Crassus
“had hitherto kept [Caesar and Pompey] in peace.”68 With
Crassus’s death, “if the one of them wished to make himself the
greatest man in Rome, he had only to overthrow the other; and
if he again wished to prevent his own fall, he had nothing for it
but to be beforehand with him whom he feared.”69
In 50 B.C., the patrician consul Marcellus, with Pompey’s
support, moved to deprive Caesar of his command in Gaul.70
When Caesar resisted, Marcellus ordered Pompey to defend
Rome against Caesar.71 Upon receiving word of this, Caesar led
part of his army across the Rubicon, the border between Gaul
and Italy, thus instigating a civil war.72
As the Roman statesmen chose sides, Cato sided with
Pompey as the lesser of two evils.73 Marcus Brutus, Cato’s
nephew and son-in-law,74 was expected to side with Caesar, as
Pompey had put his father to death.75 But Brutus, “thinking it
his duty to prefer the interest of the public to his own private
feelings, and judging Pompey’s to be the better cause, took part

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 111–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 113, 218.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119, 221.
Id. at 303–05.
Id. at 573.
See id. at 574.

358

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:347

with him.”76 Pompey and his followers left Rome before Caesar’s arrival, in order to regroup elsewhere.77 When Caesar entered Rome, he was made dictator by a rump Senate,78 consisting of those few senators who had not fled.79 He shortly
thereafter resigned the dictatorship and “declared himself consul.”80 When the tribune Mettellus tried to prevent him from
illegally taking money from the public treasury for his own
purposes, Caesar “replied that arms and laws had each their
own time; ‘If what I do displeases you, leave the place; war allows no free talking.’”81 When Mettellus again insisted, Caesar
“in a louder tone, told him he would put him to death if he gave
him any further disturbance.”82 Mettellus gave in.83
The next year, Caesar defeated Pompey’s forces at Pharsalia, in central Greece.84 Pompey himself escaped to Egypt,
where he was murdered by courtiers eager to curry favor with
Caesar.85 With Pompey’s death, Cato became the commander of
his remaining forces.86 Cato chose to make his last stand at
Utica.87 When it was clear that Caesar would overrun the city
and his compatriots suggested that Cato seek Caesar’s mercy,
Cato replied, “I would not be beholden to a tyrant for his acts of
tyranny. For it is but usurpation in him to save, as their
rightful lord, the lives of men over whom he has no title to
reign.”88 Or, in Addison’s telling, when Caesar’s emissary Decius entered Utica to assure Cato that Caesar would not harm
him, Cato replied:
Cato: My life is grafted on the fate of Rome:
Would he save Cato? Bid him spare his country.
Tell your dictator this: and tell him Cato
Disdains a life which he has power to offer.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 303–04.
78. Id. at 224.
79. See id. at 222 (noting that, before Caesar arrived, “most of the senators” fled Rome).
80. Id. at 224.
81. Id. at 223.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 227–29.
85. Id. at 132–34.
86. Id. at 306.
87. Id. at 307–16.
88. Id. at 313.
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Decius: Rome and her senators submit to Caesar;
Her generals and her consuls are no more,
Who checked his conquests and denied his triumphs.
Why will not Cato be this Caesar’s friend?
Cato: Those very reasons thou has urged forbid it.
* * *
Decius: Let [Caesar] but know the price of Cato’s friendship,
And name your terms.
Cato: Bid him disband his legions,
Restore the commonwealth to liberty,
Submit his actions to the public censure,
And stand the judgment of a Roman senate:
Bid him do this, and Cato is his friend.89

Caesar declined Cato’s offer, and, after allowing those of his
compatriots who so desired to flee or surrender,90 Cato fell on
his sword.91
Plutarch reports that over half of all Roman citizens perished in the civil war.92 Caesar offered a full pardon to all Romans who had fought against him, including Brutus and Cassius.93 At the end of the war, Caesar was made dictator-for-life,
which Plutarch calls “indeed a tyranny avowed, since his power
was not only absolute, but perpetual too.”94 Moreover, it was no
secret that Caesar desired to be king.95 Although he declined
Antony’s attempt to crown him, it was clear he did so only because accepting the crown would occasion great public discontent.96 Shakespeare’s Casca tells us that, when first offered the
crown, Caesar refused, though “he would fain have had it.”97
When Antony offered the crown a second time, Caesar again refused, but “to my / thinking, he was very loath to lay his fingers

89. ADDISON, supra note 44, at 34 –36.
90. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 312–13.
91. Id. at 315–16.
92. Id. at 234.
93. Id. at 575.
94. Id. at 235.
95. Id. at 237; see also SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 1, sc. 2, ll. 79–80
(Brutus: “What means this shouting? I do fear the people / Choose Caesar for
their king.”); id. act 1, sc. 3, ll. 86–87 (“[T]hey say the senators tomorrow /
Mean to establish Caesar as a king . . . .”).
96. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 238.
97. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 1, sc. 2, l. 239.
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off it.”98 And when offered a third time, Caesar collapsed in an
epileptic fit.99 When statues of Caesar were later “found with
royal diadems on their heads” and the tribunes pulled those diadems off and imprisoned those who had saluted Caesar as
“king,” Caesar turned the tribunes out of office.100
Indeed, it was Caesar’s desire to be king that ultimately
convinced Brutus to join the conspirators in assassinating him.
Shakespeare’s Brutus is clear: “I know no personal cause to
spurn at him, / But for the general. He would be crowned.”101
Brutus traced his lineage to Lucius Junius Brutus, the leader
of the revolt against the Tarquin monarchy in the fourth century B.C. and therefore the founder of the Roman Republic.102
(It should, perhaps, not pass without mention that Junius Brutus’s partner in this endeavor was Publius Valerius,103 under
whose name Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote The Federalist
Papers.)104 Plutarch reports that Roman citizens took to writing
anonymous notes to Brutus reminding him of his familial history and prodding him to take up the tyrannicidal mantle.105
Shakespeare shows the notes firming Brutus’s resolve to act:
“Brutus, thou sleep’st. Awake, and see thyself.
Shall Rome, etcetera. Speak, strike, redress!
Brutus, thou sleep’st: awake!”
Such instigations have been often dropped
Where I have took them up.
“Shall Rome, etcetera.” Thus must I piece it out:
Shall Rome stand under one man’s awe? What, Rome?
My ancestors did from the streets of Rome
The Tarquin drive, when he was called a king.
“Speak, strike, redress!” Am I entreated
To speak and strike? O Rome, I make thee promise:
If the redress will follow, thou receivest
Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus!106

98. Id. ll. 240–41.
99. Id. ll. 241–55.
100. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 238.
101. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 2, sc. 1, ll. 11–12.
102. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 572.
103. 1 id. at 129
104. See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE,
ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 41 (1994).
105. See 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 578 (noting that letters reading
“You are asleep, Brutus,” and “You are not a true Brutus” were left for him).
106. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 2, sc. 1, ll. 46–58.
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And Plutarch reports that Cassius told Brutus that, from him,
the Romans expected “as an hereditary debt, the extirpation of
tyranny.”107 It was such considerations that won Brutus over to
the conspirators’ cause, and it was Brutus’s participation that
won others over.108
Immediately after the deed was done on the Ides of March,
44 B.C., Brutus and his co-conspirators “marched up to the capitol, in their way showing their hands all bloody, and their
naked swords, and proclaiming liberty to the people.”109 The
Senate quickly passed an act of oblivion, providing a legal amnesty for Caesar’s friends and assassins alike, in the hopes of
avoiding any further bloodshed.110 But, of course, the concord
was not to last: Octavius Caesar—Julius Caesar’s nephew and
adopted son—joined with Antony and Lepidus (in what would
come to be called the “Second Triumvirate”111), and they pursued and made war on the conspirators.112 At Philippi, they
won a decisive victory over Brutus and Cassius, and Brutus,
imitating Cato, fell on his sword.113 In time, Octavius overpowered Antony and Lepidus and became the emperor Augustus.114
The Roman Republic was over.
C. THE MEANING OF CAESAR FOR FRANKLIN
Immediately after the death of Caesar, Shakespeare’s Cassius and Brutus offer a self-referential bit of metacommentary:
Cassius: How many ages hence
Shall this our lofty scene be acted over
In states unborn and accents yet unknown!
Brutus: How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport,
That now on Pompey’s basis lies along
No worthier than the dust!

107. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 578.
108. See id. at 579–80 (noting that “the most and best” Romans were won
over to the conspiracy “by the name of Brutus”).
109. Id. at 584.
110. Id.
111. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 51, at 164 –65.
112. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 586–609.
113. Id. at 596–608.
114. See WERNER ECK, THE AGE OF AUGUSTUS 39, 49–50 (Deborah Lucas
Schneider trans., Blackwell Publishing 2003).
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Cassius: So oft as that shall be,
So often shall the knot of us be called
The men that gave their country liberty.115

Cassius is wrong, of course, that posterity would see the assassins as bringers of liberty, for Roman republican liberty was
never to be restored. But subsequent political thought has indeed reenacted, reinterpreted, and reimagined the assassination of Caesar in states unborn and accents unknown to firstcentury B.C. Romans. And while some subsequent interpreters
have seen Caesar as a victim and Brutus as the paradigmatic
traitor,116 Franklin and his compatriots clearly thought that it
was Caesar himself, rather than Brutus and his coconspirators, who was responsible for the end of the Roman
Republic. As Bernard Bailyn has noted, American colonists in
the 1760s and 1770s “found their ideal selves, and to some extent their voices, in Brutus, in Cassius, and in Cicero.”117 And
Carl Richard has written that “[t]he founders’ principal Roman
heroes were Cato the Younger, Brutus, Cassius, and Cicero,
statesmen who had sacrificed their lives in unsuccessful attempts to save the republic in its expiring moments.”118 Franklin, a self-avowed lifelong foe of tyranny,119 noted that Caesar
“undid his Country,”120 and, in verse, compared him unfavorably to Codrus, the eleventh-century B.C. Athenian king who
sacrificed his life for his country:

115. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 3, sc. 1, ll. 111–18.
116. See, e.g., DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO, Canto 34, ll. 64 –68, at 537 (Robert M. Durling ed. & trans., 1996) (portraying Brutus and Cassius as receiving
the second-worst punishments in hell, after only Judas); 2 BERNARD SHAW,
DRAMATIC OPINIONS AND ESSAYS WITH AN APOLOGY 398 (1907) (describing
Caesar as a “great man” and his assassins as a “pitiful gang of mischiefmakers”); LAURYN HILL, Forgive Them Father, on THE MISEDUCATION OF
LAURYN HILL (Ruffhouse Records 1998) (“Like Cain and Abel, Caesar and
Brutus, Jesus and Judas, / Backstabbers do this.”).
117. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 26 (enlarged ed. 1992).
118. RICHARD, supra note 104, at 57; see also id. at 91 (“The founders’
greatest villain was Julius Caesar.”).
119. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 21 n.* (“I fancy [my brother’s]
harsh & tyrannical Treatment of me, might be a means of impressing me with
that Aversion to arbitrary Power that has stuck to me thro’ my whole Life.”);
Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood, No. 2, THE NEW-ENGLAND COURANT,
Apr. 16, 1722, at 1, reprinted in 1 FRANKLIN PAPERS (1959), supra note 43, at
11, 13 (writing, as “Silence Dogood,” that “I am . . . a mortal Enemy to arbitrary Government and unlimited Power”).
120. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD IMPROVED (1750), reprinted in 3
FRANKLIN PAPERS, supra note 43, at 437, 453 (emphasis omitted).
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For’s Country Codrus suffer’d by the Sword,
And, by his Death, his Country’s Fame restor’d;
Caesar into his Mother’s Bosom bare
Fire, Sword, and all the Ills of civil War:
Codrus confirm’d his Country’s wholesome Laws;
Caesar in Blood still justify’d his Cause.121

And Franklin made clear his admiration for Caesar’s opponents
when he rhetorically asked, “who is greater than Cato?”122 The
answer, for him, was no one.
But if the Founders, including Franklin, “revered Caesar’s
assassins Brutus and Cassius,”123 then it remains to be asked
what, precisely, were Caesar’s crimes that justified the assassination. Broadly, they can be broken down into two categories:
the instigation of civil war and the destruction of republican institutions. As noted above, Plutarch reports that more than half
of Rome’s citizenry died in the war begun by Caesar’s crossing
of the Rubicon.124 Addison has Portius, Cato’s son, remark:
Already Caesar
Has ravaged more than half the globe, and sees
Mankind grown thin by his destructive sword:
Should he go further, numbers would be wanting
To form new battles, and support his crimes.
Ye gods, what havoc does ambition make
Among your works!125

Addison’s Cato himself notes that the deaths have not merely
been casualties of war, but political killings, as well: “’Tis Caesar’s sword has made Rome’s senate little, / And thinned its
ranks.”126
And this points to the second, and perhaps greater, of Caesar’s crimes: his subversion of the Roman constitution, and
thereby of Roman liberty. Plutarch’s Brutus made clear his understanding of republican liberty when he criticized Cicero for
adhering to Octavius. Brutus said that,
in writing and speaking so well of [Octavius] Caesar, he showed that
his aim was to have an easy slavery. “But our forefathers,” said Brutus, “could not brook even gentle masters.” Further he added, that for
121. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD (1739), reprinted in 2 FRANKLIN
PAPERS (1960), supra note 43, at 217, 220.
122. Benjamin Franklin, The Busy-Body, No. 3, AM. WKLY. MERCURY, Feb.
18, 1729, at 1, reprinted in 1 FRANKLIN PAPERS (1959), supra note 43, at 118, 119.
123. RICHARD, supra note 104, at 65.
124. See supra text accompanying note 92.
125. ADDISON, supra note 44, at 8.
126. Id. at 37.
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his own part he had not as yet fully resolved whether he should make
war or peace; but as to one point he was fixed and settled, which was,
never to be a slave.127

In this, Brutus expresses what later political theorists would
call “liberty as non-domination”128—that is, the idea that one is
unfree if another has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in
that person’s range of choices.129 What is unique about this republican conception of liberty is that one who lives under an
arbitrary power is unfree even if that arbitrary power is never
actually exercised.130 For the republican, “liberty is always cast
in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and
slave,”131 and “slavery is essentially characterized by domination, not by actual interference.”132 This means that “no matter
how permissive the lord is, the fact of depending on his grace
and favour, the fact of living under his domination, entails an
absence of freedom.”133 In Brutus’s words, freedom entails a refusal to brook even gentle masters.
Because those who operate the levers of power must have
the authority to interfere in the choices of others,134 republican
liberty can be established only where that interference cannot
be arbitrary. That is, the rulers themselves must be constrained by law. To put it differently, republican government
must be constitutional government. Where law no longer constrains the rulers, republicanism degenerates into tyranny, regardless of how the tyrant actually behaves.
To his opponents, Caesar’s behavior from an early period
demonstrated that tyranny was his goal. From using his political power and the spoils of war to secure patronage benefits for
127. 2 PLUTARCH, supra note 45, at 587.
128. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT 21 (1997). For a full discussion of this conception of liberty, see
generally id. at 17–79.
129. See id. at 52 (listing the criteria for domination).
130. See id. at 22 (“[I]t is possible to have domination without interference
and interference without domination.”).
131. Id. at 31.
132. Id. at 32.
133. Id. at 33.
134. This is implicit in Weber’s definition of the state as “the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate
physical violence within a particular territory.” MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong
eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., Hackett 2004); cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610 n.22 (1986) (“The violence of judges
and officials of a posited constitutional order is generally understood to be implicit in the practice of law and government.”).
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his supporters,135 to agreeing with Pompey and Crassus to divide the empire amongst themselves,136 to using intimidation
and open violence to carry elections,137 Caesar gave every indication of seeking expansive power even before the civil war, as
Cato frequently pointed out.138 During the war, Caesar had a
rump Senate, consisting entirely of those who had not fled upon
his armed entrance to the city—and therefore presumably were
his friends and supporters—proclaim him dictator,139 a title
that he then exchanged on his own authority for consul.140
When Mettellus, the tribune, objected to certain illegalities,
Caesar threatened his life.141 After the war, Caesar became dictator-for-life, and sought to become king.142 It was these facts
that convinced Brutus and his co-conspirators that Caesar
aimed at becoming—and, by the end, had become—a tyrant.
Thus, when Lucius urged Addison’s Cato to surrender, Cato
replied, “Would Lucius have me live to swell the number / Of
Caesar’s slaves, or by a base submission / Give up the cause of
Rome, and own a tyrant?”143 Or, as Shakespeare’s Brutus tells
the assembled crowd after the deed is done:
Had you rather Caesar were living and die all
slaves, than that Caesar were dead, to live all free men?
* * *
Who is here
so base that would be a bondman?144

The repetition of the language of slavery is not coincidental. By
discarding the Roman constitution—by casting off all legal constraints on his own action—Caesar had destroyed Roman liberty. Under Caesar’s tyranny, all Romans were reduced to the
status of slaves, without regard to the harshness or mildness of
Caesar’s actual rule.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 60–61.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 62–63.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
138. See sources cited supra note 56.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.
140. See supra text accompanying note 80.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 94–100.
143. ADDISON, supra note 44, at 81. Addison made the same point in an
essay a few years later. He justified the assassination on the grounds that
“Caesar, from the condition of a fellow-citizen, had risen by the most indirect
methods, and broken through all the laws of the community, to place himself
at the head of the government, and enslave his country.” JOSEPH ADDISON,
Freeholder, No. 51, in ADDISON, supra note 44, at 249, 250.
144. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 3, sc. 2, ll. 22–23, 27–28.
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Franklin and his compatriots’ lionization of the assassins,
then, made it clear that they agreed that tyranny—that is, the
subversion of the republican constitution and the exercise of
power unconstrained by law—as well as the initiation of a
bloody civil war for personal gain, justified an assassination.
And adding to the credibility of the assassins was that they
acted openly. Rather than assassinate Caesar in the night, or
poison him, they assaulted him in the Senate. Immediately afterward, they marched through the streets, with his blood still
on their clothes, declaring and justifying their actions.145 Much
as Franklin and his colleagues had recently done with regard to
another radical political act, Caesar’s assassins showed “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind” by submitting their
“Facts . . . to a candid world.”146 By acting openly, the conspirators asserted that they acted in the public interest, and they
invited the polity to debate whether their judgment of the public interest was correct.147 For American patriots of Franklin’s
generation, it was.
But, of course, the fact that these were assassinable offenses under the circumstances does not mean that the institutional arrangement necessitating assassination was ideal. For
Franklin, Caesar deserved to be removed, and assassination
was the only way open to Brutus to remove him; but this does
not make assassination a good political tool, for several reasons. First, the assassination was ineffective in restoring liberty—after another bloody civil war, the Second Triumvirate
came to power. Octavius gradually overpowered his colleagues,
until he was able to go further than Caesar ever did in the direction of tyranny, becoming the emperor Augustus. The assassination of Caesar did not bring back republican Rome. Second
is what might be called the epistemic humility point: not every
assassin will be a Brutus; indeed, as we shall see, some will be
John Wilkes Booths.148 If someone mistakenly thinks that a ruler has crossed the line into tyranny and therefore assassinates
that ruler, then the assassin has committed both a terrible in145. See supra text accompanying note 109.
146. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
147. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 265–66 (Penguin Books rev. & enlarged ed. 1994) (1963)
(arguing that, under certain circumstances, assassination can be justified, so
long as the assassin immediately surrenders to the police and “use[s] his trial
to show the world . . . what crimes against his people had been committed and
gone unpunished”).
148. See infra Part III.
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justice and a highly disruptive political act. Franklin made
clear his concern with this aspect of assassination when he
noted that it deprives its object not only of his life, but also “of
the opportunity of vindicating his character,”149 and that it provides no opportunity “for his honorable acquittal when he
should be unjustly accused.”150
What Franklin sought was a mechanism with both the
substantive reach of assassination and the procedural mechanisms to satisfy these concerns. He sought to “regular[ize]”151 assassination—that is, to tame it—by proceduralizing it. Like assassination, impeachment would remove “chief Magistrate[s
who had] rendered [themselves] obnoxious”152 by doing things
like starting civil wars or subverting the constitution. But unlike assassination, impeachment would be epistemically humble—it would allow for the acquittal and vindication of the innocent—and it would be less disruptive to the polity, making it
less likely to provoke the kind of backlash that led to the rise of
Augustus.
However, the one example of proceduralized justice for a
chief magistrate available to Franklin was not without its own
problems, as we shall see in the next Part.
II. CHARLES I AND THE REGICIDES; BUCKINGHAM AND
FELTON
A. FRANKLIN AND CHARLES
When Franklin referred to “one example only of a first
Magistrate being formally brought to public Justice” which
“[e]very body cried out agst . . . as unconstitutional,”153 he undoubtedly had in mind the trial and execution of Charles I in
1649.154 The reign of the Stuarts was a well-recognized cautionary tale for those who, like Franklin, were active in colonial
politics. Indeed, as Jack Greene has shown, eighteenth-century
colonial legislative behavior was “deeply rooted” in seven-

149. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. I am not the first to have made this connection. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr.,
The Trial of Charles I: A Sesquitricentennial Reflection, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
51, 52 (1999).
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teenth-century parliamentary opposition to the Stuarts.155 Colonial familiarity with the Stuart reign was so “vivid” that “colonial legislators had a strong predisposition to look at each
governor as a potential Charles I or James II, to assume a hostile posture toward the executive, and to define with the broadest possible latitude the role of the lower house as ‘the main
barrier of all those rights and privileges which British subjects
enjoy.’”156 As a man who was both unusually well-read and unusually active in colonial politics, Franklin would of course
have been deeply familiar with the history of conflict between
the Stuarts and Parliament. Franklin’s lifelong and oft-stated
hatred of tyranny157 would almost certainly have taken Charles
I and James II as paradigm cases of tyranny writ large.
Franklin had no shortage of reading matter to familiarize
himself with the reign of the Stuarts. Like others active in colonial politics, Franklin would have been familiar with John
Rushworth’s eight-volume Historical Collections, which was
largely devoted to Charles’s reign,158 as well as with the collection of State Trials, first published in 1719, which included the
trial of Charles I.159 In his Autobiography, Franklin notes that
he acquired his uncle’s collection of “all the principal Pamphlets
relating to Public Affairs from 1641 to 1717;”160 clearly the Civil
War and the trial and execution of Charles I would have been
the principal focus of the earlier pamphlets in this collection. In
addition to these primary sources, Franklin was also familiar
with any number of historians of the period, including both
Whig historians, like Paul de Rapin-Thoyras161 and Catherine
155. See JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189–90 (1994).
156. Id. at 199 (quoting LAWRENCE H. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY:
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, 1689–1763, at 87 (1968) (quoting a
1728 address of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Lieutenant Governor)).
157. See supra note 119.
158. See GREENE, supra note 155, at 194 (noting the familiarity of colonial
legislators with the Historical Collections).
159. See Trial of Charles I, in 1 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF STATETRYALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE
FOURTH, TO THE END OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE 510 (Thomas Salmon ed.,
London, Goodwin et al. 1719). For ease of reference, I shall hereinafter refer to
the version published in Howell’s State Trials in the early-nineteenth century.
See infra notes 240, 286–305.
160. FRANKLIN, supra note 36, at 6.
161. Among the first books ordered for Franklin’s Library Company of
Philadelphia was Rapin’s History of England. See Edmunds, supra note 38, at
300 (noting the order placed for “Rapin’s History of England. 12 Vol’.” in octavo).
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Macaulay,162 and Tory historians, like David Hume163 and Lord
Clarendon.164
Thus, when Franklin thought about the removal of an obnoxious executive, his mind naturally turned to Charles I, and
the “formal[]” way in which he was “brought to public Justice.”165 In order to understand what Franklin found both appealing and upsetting about the proceedings against Charles, it
will help to examine those proceedings, and certain political
controversies surrounding them, in detail. As in the previous
Part, this Part will rely primarily on sources, like those discussed above, that were available to Franklin and his contemporaries.
B. CHARLES, BUCKINGHAM, AND FELTON
It is unnecessary to rehearse here the litany of complaints
that began accumulating against Charles I even before he assumed the throne in 1625. After first unsuccessfully attempting
a deeply unpopular marriage match with the (Catholic) Spanish Infanta,166 he ultimately concluded an only slightly less unpopular marriage with the (Catholic) Princess Henrietta Maria
162. Franklin listed Macaulay among the writers of “true History.” See
Benjamin Franklin, “A Traveller”: News-Writers’ Nonsense, PUB. ADVERTISER,
May 22, 1765, reprinted in 12 FRANKLIN PAPERS (1968), supra note 43, at 132,
135. Macaulay and Franklin socialized in Paris in the 1770s. See Letter from
Catherine Macaulay to Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 8, 1777), in 25 FRANKLIN
PAPERS (William B. Wilcox ed., 1986), supra note 43, at 264, 264 –65 (apologizing for not having seen Franklin recently, but noting, “[y]ou are very sensible
that the suspenssion of the Habeas Corpus Act subjects me to an immediat
imprisonment on any suspicion of my having held a correspondence with your
Countrymen on this side the Water . . . . I am now nursing my constitution to enable me to treat largely on our fatal civil wars in the History I am now about”).
163. When Franklin lived in London in the late 1750s and early 1760s, he
cultivated a friendship with Hume, who was at the time completing his History of England. See ISAACSON, supra note 37, at 196–97 (describing Franklin’s
friendship with Hume); see also Franklin, “A Traveller,” supra note 162, at 135
(listing Hume among the writers of “true History”).
164. In 1738, Franklin placed an ad in his Pennsylvania Gazette which
read, “Lent and Lost, the Earl of Clarendon’s History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars, Vol. I. . . . Whoever brings it to the Printer hereof, shall be handsomely rewarded.” Advertisement, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 6, 1738, reprinted in 2
FRANKLIN PAPERS (1960), supra note 43, at 216, 216.
165. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.
166. See JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE
PASSAGES OF STATE. WEIGHTY MATTERS IN LAW. REMARKABLE PROCEEDINGS
IN FIVE PARLIAMENTS. BEGINNING THE SIXTEENTH YEAR OF KING JAMES,
ANNO 1618. AND ENDING THE FIFTH YEAR OF KING CHARLS, ANNO 1629, at
76–103 (London, Newcomb 1659) (describing the trip to Spain); id. at 119–26
(reprinting Buckingham’s narrative of the trip).
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of France.167 The new Anglo-French alliance went to war
against the Habsburg rulers of Spain and Austria, a war that
went badly from the beginning.168 And the alliance with the
French, beset with mutual jealousy and suspicion from its inception,169 became intolerable to many Englishmen when borrowed English ships were used to attack fellow Protestants, the
Huguenots at La Rochelle.170 Of course, these expeditions were
costly, and when Parliament demanded the redress of certain
grievances as a condition for granting supply to the Crown,
Charles dissolved Parliament and unconstitutionally relied on
prerogative taxation.171 This naturally generated further discontent. And at the center of public and parliamentary unhappiness was the Duke of Buckingham.
George Villiers, the first Duke of Buckingham, had risen
from obscurity to become the court favorite of James I.172 In
what can only be described as a remarkable feat of political
dexterity, he managed to retain and further consolidate his status as favorite when Charles came to the throne.173 It was,
therefore, inevitable that popular dissatisfaction with the
course of royal government would fall on Buckingham’s shoulders, especially given the legal maxim that “the king can do no
wrong.”174 Moreover, Buckingham’s position as Lord Admiral
167. See 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE INVASION
JULIUS CAESAR TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 159–60 (LibertyClassics
1983) (1778) (noting that the increasingly powerful “puritanical party” disliked
the match with France and the promise to tolerate Catholicism that Charles
had agreed to as part of the marriage treaty); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at
168–69 (noting the marriage).
168. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 166 (noting the disaster of the Cadiz
expedition); 10 M. DE RAPIN THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 33–34 (N.
Tindal trans., London, Knapton 1730) (same); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at
196 (same); id. at 152–54 (noting the disaster of the Austrian expedition under
the command of Count Mansfield).
169. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 163.
170. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 15; RUSHWORTH, supra note
166, at 174 –76.
171. Charles’s relationship with his Parliaments is discussed in depth in
Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1083, 1100–16 (2009).
172. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 61 (noting that Villiers, “a youth of
one-and-twenty, younger brother of a good family” first came to James’s attention); id. at 63–64 (recounting Villiers’s rapid rise through the hierarchy of
honors under James).
173. See 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 1–2 (noting the continuity
of Buckingham’s influence).
174. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254 –55 (“That the king
can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principal of the English conOF
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gave him command responsibility for the fate of the English
fleet.175 In the very first year of Charles’s reign, the House of
Commons “loudly complained” about Buckingham’s part in allowing the French to use English ships at La Rochelle.176 Hume
speculates that “spleen and ill-will against the duke of Buckingham” were largely responsible for the failure of Charles’s
first Parliament to vote him the funds he sought.177
But the rising costs of Charles’s military plans forced him
to call a new Parliament in 1626 in the hopes that it would be
more generous than its predecessor.178 The new House of
Commons “fell upon the Duke, as the chief cause of all publick
Miscarriages,”179 and soon reported thirteen articles of impeachment against Buckingham, accusing him of everything
from procuring too many offices for himself and for others in
the development of a large patronage network, to failing, in his
capacity as Lord Admiral, to defend the seas adequately, to delivering ships to the French to be used against La Rochelle, to
embezzling Crown money and lands, to playing a role in
James’s death by keeping medicine from him on his sickbed.180
The truth of any particular of these accusations is immaterial;
what matters for the purposes of the present discussion is that
Buckingham’s enemies—a class which included an increasingly
large percentage of the English population181—believed them.
Charles immediately had the Commons’s two impeachment
managers, Sir Dudley Digges and Sir John Elliott, imprisoned
in the Tower.182 This served only to enrage the House further,
and Charles was forced to back down and release them.183
stitution: meaning only . . . [that] whatever may be amiss in the conduct of
public affairs is not chargeable personally on the king; nor is he, but his ministers, accountable for it to the people . . . .”); 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 291
(“The king, by the maxims of law, could do no wrong: His ministers and servants, of whatever degree, in case of any violation of the constitution, were
alone culpable.”).
175. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 308.
176. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 15–16.
177. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 158. For more on Charles’s struggles with
the 1625 Parliament over money, see Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1101–02.
178. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 198.
179. Id. at 217.
180. See 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 71–72 (giving an “abstract”
of the charges); RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 302–53 (laying out and elaborating upon the articles of impeachment).
181. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 168 (noting that Buckingham “became
every day more unpopular”).
182. Id. at 171.
183. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 74 –75.
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Charles then sent a letter to the House, reminding it that
he was still in need of funds, and demanding an immediate
grant of supply. Any further delay, he wrote, would be regarded
as tantamount to an outright denial of funds.184 As Rapin
notes, this was obviously “an Artifice to evade” Buckingham’s
trial—by demanding an immediate vote of funds, Charles could
dissolve or prorogue Parliament as soon as they were granted
and before the Lords could try Buckingham.185 The House did
not cooperate; instead, it prepared a remonstrance against
Buckingham, demanding his removal and attacking Charles’s
reliance on prerogative taxation, particularly the customs duties of tonnage and poundage.186 Before the remonstrance could
be presented, the King dissolved Parliament, accusing the
House of Commons of neglecting public business in its drive to
punish Buckingham.187 If they were not going to give the King
the money he sought, he certainly had no intention of waiting
around for them to convict his royal favorite. As Rapin puts it,
“[n]o body doubted but the Duke of Buckingham’s Interest was
the sole Cause of this Dissolution.”188
After the dissolution of this Parliament, Charles relied
even more heavily on unconstitutional prerogative taxation.189
Even Hume, an historian otherwise relatively sympathetic to
Charles, describes this taxation as “a violation of liberty
[which] must, by necessary consequence, render all parliaments
superfluous.”190 As a result, “[i]t may safely be affirmed, that,
except a few courtiers or ecclesiastics, all men were displeased
with this high exertion of prerogative, and this new spirit of
administration.”191 Rather than rein in his spending, Charles
chose this moment to begin a war with France by sending an

184. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 390–91.
185. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 79. The Lords were in the
midst of their own battle with the King, over the imprisonment of the Earl of
Arundel, and there was every likelihood that they would visit their displeasure at the state of royal government on Buckingham’s head. See Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1104 –06 (discussing the dispute over Arundel’s imprisonment).
186. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 398, 400–06. On the long-running
battle between Charles and his Parliaments over tonnage and poundage, see
Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1101–02, 1106–12.
187. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 398, 410.
188. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 84.
189. See 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 176–80 (describing the levying of ship
money and forced loans).
190. Id. at 177.
191. Id. at 181.
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expedition in relief of the Huguenots at La Rochelle.192 Hume
notes that “[a]ll authentic memoirs, both foreign and domestic,
ascribe to Buckingham’s counsels this war with France,”193 and
he asserts that Buckingham’s motive was his passion for the
French Queen.194 Buckingham was commissioned to lead the
expedition himself.195 When the fleet arrived at La Rochelle,
the Huguenot inhabitants refused to admit the soldiers into the
city.196 Buckingham withdrew to the nearby Île de Ré. The ineptitude of Buckingham’s siege of the French fort on Ré allowed
the French to land reinforcements.197 The result was a “total
rout” in which Buckingham lost two-thirds of his forces,198 and
he returned home to “a world of Complaints and Murmurs
against” him.199 Moreover, the expense of the Rochelle expedition exceeded what could be raised even through unconstitutional prerogative taxation, leaving Charles under the necessity
of calling a new Parliament, his third, in 1628.200
This Parliament assembled in a confrontational mood, refusing to act on Charles’s demands for funds until its grievances were redressed.201 These grievances took the form of the
Petition of Right,202 to which Charles was forced to assent early
in the new Parliament.203 The Petition complained of the exaction of forced loans and prerogative taxation, of imprisonments
without due process, of the forced quartering of soldiers and
sailors, and of the imposition of martial law.204 In debating the
Petition, Sir Francis Seymour expressed the sentiments of the
House when he thundered that “he is not a good subject, he is a
slave, who will allow his goods to be taken from him against his

192. See id. at 181–82, 184 –85.
193. Id. at 182.
194. Id. at 182–84.
195. Id. at 185.
196. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 122–23.
197. Id. at 123; 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 185.
198. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 185; see also 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra
note 168, at 124.
199. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 125.
200. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 187.
201. See RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 499 (noting that the first day of
the new Parliament “was spent in opening the grievances and state of the
Kingdom”).
202. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car., c. 1, §§ 1–11 (Eng.).
203. On the slightly complicated history of precisely how Charles signified
his assent to the Petition, see 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 197–200.
204. Petition of Right §§ 1–9.
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will, and his liberty against the laws of the kingdom.”205 And
the House had no doubts about who was to blame—in the
words of the venerable Sir Edward Coke, “the Duke of Buckingham is the cause of all our miseries[,] . . . that man is the
Grievance of Grievances: let us set down the causes of our disasters, and all will reflect upon him.”206 In assenting to the Petition, Charles agreed to cease the complained of activities; he
expected that, in return, he would be granted the supply he
sought to carry out his foreign adventures.207
But the House was in no mood to be so agreeable. Immediately after Charles’s assent to the Petition, the House passed
a resolution declaring that “the excessive Power of the Duke of
Buckingham, is the cause of the Evils and Dangers to the King
and Kingdom,”208 and began preparing a remonstrance spelling
out Buckingham’s sins in great detail.209 That remonstrance
was followed in short order by another decrying the King’s collection of tonnage and poundage without parliamentary authorization and warning him not to do so again.210 Charles immediately prorogued Parliament, citing the remonstrances as the
cause, even though he had not yet received most of the funds he
sought.211
As soon as Parliament was prorogued, Buckingham went
to Portsmouth, where he was overseeing the outfitting of a new
fleet to attack the French forces besieging La Rochelle.212 While
there, on August 23, 1628, he was assassinated by an army
veteran named John Felton.213 Felton had served under Buckingham as a lieutenant; when his captain died in 1626, he
hoped for the promotion.214 Instead, the promotion went to
Henry Hunckes, the nephew of Sir Edward Conway, a secretary
of state and ally of Buckingham.215 In 1627, when another cap205. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 189; see also id. at 190 (quoting Sir Robert
Philips using the language of enslavement to describe Charles’s actions).
206. RUSHWORTH, supra note 166, at 607.
207. See id. at 614 –15 (reprinting Charles’s demand for funds, immediately
after his (second) assent to the Petition of Right).
208. Id. at 617.
209. See id. at 619–26 (reprinting the remonstrance).
210. See id. at 628–30 (reprinting the second remonstrance).
211. Id. at 631.
212. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 202–03.
213. Id. at 203.
214. Id.
215. Thomas Cogswell, John Felton, Popular Political Culture, and the Assassination of the Duke of Buckingham, 49 HIST. J. 357, 362 (2006).
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tain died at Ré (where Felton was wounded), he again lost out
on the promotion to someone better connected.216 Thus Felton
twice “fell afoul of Buckingham’s formidable patronage network.”217 Of course, Buckingham’s near monopoly on state offices and his use of them to further entrench himself and his
friends in power was not merely an obstacle to Felton’s career
advancement; it was also one of the chief heads of complaint
against Buckingham throughout the nation.218 Felton and his
fellow veterans were also owed a substantial amount of back
pay, and they were increasingly dissatisfied with the delay in
disbursing that pay.219 But this, too, was merely the private
side of one of the pervasive public complaints against Buckingham—that he was, both by the expense of the policies he advocated and the lavishness of the gifts he received, bankrupting
the Crown.220
Felton was intimately aware of these heads of public complaint against Buckingham. After leaving the army, he immersed himself in the underground world of London opposition
pamphleteering.221 These pamphlets—and poems and ballads—
not only attacked Buckingham, they increasingly called for his
assassination.222 One of the most prominent opposition pamphlets was written by William Fleetwood, a fellow veteran of the
Île de Ré. In his account, after the rout he and his comrades
had decided to assassinate Buckingham, but then changed
their minds, resolving that “it was only ‘fitt to let him die, by
the unquestionable hand of Parliament’.”223 Fleetwood therefore calls on Parliament “to deliver ‘a revenge upon the Instrument’” of his (and the nation’s) misfortune.224 That is, although
they first contemplated assassination, they decided instead to
advocate the domesticated version: impeachment.
But the problem with impeachment in the British context
was that the King could prorogue or dissolve Parliament when216. Id. at 364 –65.
217. Id. at 362.
218. See supra text accompanying note 180.
219. See Cogswell, supra note 215, at 369–70, 377–78.
220. See supra text accompanying note 180; see also Cogswell, supra note
215, at 377 (“Charles and Buckingham, however, had decided to concentrate
their limited cash reserves on mounting the next military effort; this meant that
Felton and thousands of other officers and men would have to wait for payment.”).
221. See Cogswell, supra note 215, at 365–69, 374 –77.
222. Id. at 364, 366, 369, 374 –77.
223. Id. at 364 (quoting Fleetwood’s pamphlet).
224. Id.
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ever he saw fit, thereby preventing the impeachment of anyone
he wished to protect. After the 1628 parliamentary attack on
Buckingham—like the 1626 attack—was cut short by the King,
it became clear to Felton that “there was no legislative solution
to Buckingham.”225 Indeed, the 1628 parliamentary remonstrance against Buckingham was hugely influential to Felton;
he later acknowledged that it was by “reading the remonstrance of the House of Parliament [that] it came into his mind
[that] by . . . killing the Duke he should do his country great
service.”226 In fact, before killing Buckingham, he had sewn into
his hat several lines from the remonstrance, intending them to
serve as explanation and justification in the event that he was
killed during the attempt.227
Felton’s single and singular act thus plays out the connections between impeachment and assassination. Felton felt he
had been personally injured by the Duke, but he also saw that
injury to be a personal manifestation of the injuries that Buckingham was perpetrating on the nation. After all, Felton’s injuries were caused by Buckingham’s military ineptitude, his privileging of patronage connections over merit in doling out state
offices, and his bankrupting of the nation. And those were three
of the general heads of complaint against Buckingham, as
spelled out not only in opposition pamphlets and street ballads,
but also in frustrated parliamentary impeachment attempts
and remonstrances. But impeachment, although a more regularized form of assassination, was not regularized enough—it
could always be frustrated by the will of the King. That is what
Felton saw and Fleetwood could not. It was at this junction of
private wrongs, public wrongs, and parliamentary impotence
that Felton acted. And although he likely acted alone, he was
widely celebrated as a hero.228
C. CHARLES AFTER BUCKINGHAM
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the removal of
Buckingham from the scene did not, in fact, usher in a new
spirit of harmony between Charles and his subjects. During the
1628 prorogation, Charles continued to collect tonnage and
225. Id. at 373.
226. ROGER LOCKYER, BUCKINGHAM: THE LIFE AND POLITICAL CAREER OF
GEORGE VILLIERS, FIRST DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM, 1592–1628, at 458 (1981) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Felton).
227. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 204 –05.
228. See Cogswell, supra note 215, at 358, 380–85.
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poundage without parliamentary approval, leading to a merchant revolt.229 When Parliament reconvened, the Commons refused to grant any further funds, leading Charles to dissolve
Parliament and resolve to govern without it.230 Meanwhile, La
Rochelle fell to the besieging French troops,231 and Charles,
without money and despairing of success, signed peace treaties
with France in 1629232 and Spain in 1630.233 As Hume notes,
“[t]he influence of these two wars on domestic affairs, and on
the dispositions of king and people, was of the utmost consequence: But no alteration was made by them on the foreign interests of the kingdom.”234 In other words, Charles squandered
huge amounts of blood and treasure—much of it raised unconstitutionally—and utterly alienated the affections of his parliaments and his people for no gain whatsoever.
During Charles’s rule without Parliament, he continued to
antagonize the increasingly powerful and restive Puritan party,
particularly in his advancement of William Laud, the Bishop of
London, whom Charles raised to Archbishop of Canterbury,
and who was a staunch advocate of high-church Arminianism.235 In addition to the religious strife, there was growing political resistance to Charles’s “violations, some more open, some
more disguised, of the privileges of the nation.”236 These included the unconstitutional levying of tonnage and poundage
and ship money without the consent of Parliament237 and the
expansion of the jurisdiction of Star Chamber.238 What these
had in common was their extension of royal prerogative at the
expense of institutions meant to check it. As Hume notes, if
Charles could levy some taxes without parliamentary consent,
then “[b]y the same right any other tax might be imposed,”239
and any need for calling Parliaments would be obviated. Like229. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 205–06.
230. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 207–17.
231. Id. at 205.
232. See 1 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS. THE SECOND
PART, CONTAINING THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS WHICH HAPPENED FROM THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT, ON THE 10TH OF MARCH, 4. CAR. I. 1628/9.
UNTIL THE SUMMONING OF ANOTHER PARLIAMENT 23–25 (London, Wright &
Chiswell 1680) (reprinting the peace treaty with France).
233. See id. at 75–76 (noting the peace treaty with Spain).
234. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 218.
235. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 208–13, 250–51, 273–74.
236. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 229.
237. Id at 229, 235.
238. Id. at 232.
239. Id. at 235.

378

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:347

wise, by allowing prerogative courts like Star Chamber to
poach the jurisdiction of the common-law courts, the traditional
role of the latter as protectors of English liberty was diminished. And even the common-law courts were subject to royal
interference, as the infamous verdict in favor of the Crown in
the 1637 Ship Money Case showed.240 Hume notes that this decision “rouzed [the people] from their lethargy” and convinced
them “that liberty was totally subverted, and an unusual and
arbitrary authority exercised over the kingdom. Slavish principles, they said, concur with illegal practices; ecclesiastical tyranny gives aid to civil usurpation; iniquitous taxes are supported by arbitrary punishments.”241
In the same year as the Ship Money Case, Charles decided
to introduce a new high-church liturgy into predominantly
Presbyterian Scotland.242 The Scots rioted, and, as Charles refused to back down, the riots turned into an insurrection, and
the insurrection turned into a war in 1639.243 With the financial necessity brought on by the war, Charles could no longer
avoid calling a Parliament, and the new Parliament assembled
in April 1640.244 But the new Parliament—which had more
sympathy for the Scots’ religious scruples than for the King’s
high-church policies—turned to its grievances before giving any
thought to supplying the war effort.245 Their grievances fell
broadly under three heads: “those with regard to privileges of
parliament, to the property of the subject, and to religion.”246
Enraged, Charles dissolved this Parliament—known to history
as the “Short Parliament”—less than a month after it assembled and (in clear violation of parliamentary privilege247) imprisoned some of the opposition figures.248 In Rapin’s words,
“’twas known by Experience, that [Charles] would draw from
the least Precedent, Consequences destructive of the Liberty of
240. Ship Money Case, 3 Howell’s State Trials 825 (Exch. 1637) (finding
that financial necessity justified the Crown in levying otherwise unconstitutional taxes and that the Crown was the sole judge of necessity); see also 5
HUME, supra note 167, at 245–48 (summarizing the Ship Money Case); 10
RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 304 –07 (same).
241. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 248.
242. Id. at 254 –55.
243. Id. at 255–65.
244. Id. at 269.
245. Id. at 271–72; 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 411, 416–17.
246. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 272.
247. See generally CHAFETZ, supra note 4 (discussing parliamentary privilege).
248. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 276; 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168,
at 420.
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Parliaments, and in fine, the Number of Male-contents was infinite.”249 Charles’s coffers, however, were quite finite, and his
attempts to force a new loan from his subjects were “repelled by
the spirit of liberty, which was now become unconquerable.”250
Moreover, the Scottish army had not only defeated Charles’s
forces in Scotland, it had crossed the English border and taken
Newcastle.251 Charles quickly negotiated a treaty with the
Scots that obliged him to pay for the Scottish army’s expenses,
as well as those of his own army.252 He had no choice but to call
another Parliament—his last—to raise the necessary funds.253
In order to placate this new Parliament—later known as
the “Long Parliament”—Charles sacrificed his new royal favorite, the Earl of Strafford.254 Despite promising Strafford that he
would support him, Charles assented to the bill of attainder
passed by both houses of Parliament and allowed Strafford to
be executed in May 1641.255 Charles must have hoped that by
allowing Strafford, unlike Buckingham, to feel the wrath of
parliamentary justice, he would repair his relationship with
Parliament and the public. As further efforts in that direction,
Charles consented to abolish Star Chamber and to commission
common-law judges during good behavior, rather than at the
pleasure of the Crown.256 But these gestures were in vain.
When a Catholic rebellion erupted in Ireland, leading to a massacre of English Protestants,257 the rebels claimed to act under
Charles’s authority, and Parliament believed them.258 Soon
thereafter, the House of Commons passed the so-called Grand
Remonstrance, reciting every grievance from the entirety of
Charles’s reign—206 enumerated grievances in all.259 In

249. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 435.
250. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 278.
251. Id. at 279.
252. 10 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 452–53.
253. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 282.
254. See id. at 309–10.
255. See id. at 309–26 (describing the history of Strafford’s trial and execution). Upon learning that Charles had assented to the bill of attainder, Strafford quoted Psalms 146:3: “Put not your trust in princes, nor in the sons of
men: For in them there is no salvation.” Id. at 326 (italicization removed).
256. Id. at 328–30.
257. See id. at 341, 345.
258. Id. at 346, 349.
259. See 1 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS. THE THIRD PART;
IN TWO VOLUMES. CONTAINING THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS WHICH HAPPENED
FROM THE MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT, NOVEMBER THE 3D. 1640 TO THE
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Hume’s apt summary, the House concluded that Charles’s actions amounted to “a total subversion of the constitution.”260
With this, the House provoked Charles into a fatal misstep: on
January 3, 1642, he accused five members of the House of
Commons and one member of the House of Lords—all of whom
were leaders of the opposition to the Crown—of treason and
sought to have them tried before the Lords.261 This led to an escalating series of confrontations, the most salient moment of
which involved Charles’s arrival at the House of Commons with
an armed guard, demanding that the accused members be
turned over to him. The public outrage was so extreme that
Charles was forced to flee London, and the Civil War commenced.262
In March 1642, Parliament passed the Militia Act, taking
upon itself command authority over the militia.263 Several
months later, Charles raised his standard at Nottingham,264
and the Battle of Edgehill followed in October.265 Almost four
years of bloody fighting ensued, as parliamentary forces gradually gained the upper hand.266 In May 1646, Charles surrendered to Parliament’s Scottish allies; in January 1647, the
Scots handed him over to the parliamentary forces.267
Predictably, with the King in custody, tensions between
Parliament and the army came to the fore. After the army forcibly took custody of the King away from those who were holding
him pursuant to parliamentary orders,268 the officers, led by
Oliver Cromwell, debated the question of what to do with
Charles. Clarendon reports that there were three schools of
thought:
Some were for an actual deposing him; which could not but be easily
brought to pass, since the parliament would vote any thing they
should be directed: others were for the taking away his life by poison;
which would make the least noise; or, if that could not be so easily
contrived, by assassination; for which there were hands enough ready
END OF THE YEAR 1644, at 437–51 (London, Chiswell & Cockerill 1692) [hereinafter RUSHWORTH, THIRD PART] (reprinting the remonstrance).
260. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 352.
261. Id. at 364 –65; 11 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 308–10.
262. See Chafetz, supra note 171, at 1112–15 (describing the incident in
detail).
263. 1 RUSHWORTH, THIRD PART, supra note 259, at 526–28.
264. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 385.
265. Id. at 396–97.
266. See generally id. at 397–489 (describing the course of the war).
267. Id. at 489–91.
268. Id. at 497.

2010]

IMPEACHMENT AND ASSASSINATION

381

to be employed. There was a third sort, as violent as either of the other, who pressed to have him brought to a public trial as a malefactor;
which, they said, would be most for the honour of the parliament, and
would teach all kings to know, that they were accountable and punishable for the wickedness of their lives.269

Hume explains why they settled on the third option:
To murder him privately was exposed to the imputation of injustice
and cruelty, aggravated by the baseness of such a crime; and every
odious epithet of Traitor and Assassin would, by the general voice of
mankind, be undisputably ascribed to the actors in such a villany.
Some unexpected procedure must be attempted, which would astonish
the world by its novelty, would bear the semblance of justice, and
would cover its barbarity by the audaciousness of the enterprize.270

On November 20, 1648, the army presented a remonstrance to
Parliament, the first article of which demanded “[t]hat the King
be brought to Justice, as the capital Cause of all the Evils in
the Kingdom, and of so much Blood being shed.”271 But the
House of Commons decided against giving the army’s remonstrance “speedy consideration,”272 and instead voted to enter into peace negotiations with the King, based on terms that he
had proposed to it.273
This was a concession too far for the army. On December 6,
1648, Colonel Pride surrounded the House of Commons with
two regiments and prevented approximately 200 members from
entering Parliament.274 The event, which came to be known as
“Pride’s Purge,” left the House dominated by supporters of the
army.275 The purged House, known to history as the “Rump
Parliament,” immediately reversed the vote to enter into negotiations with the King, declaring his proposals unacceptable.276
And on December 23, the House appointed a committee to “receive all Informations and Examinations of all Witnesses for

269. EDWARD EARL OF CLARENDON, THE HISTORY OF THE REBELLION AND
CIVIL WARS IN ENGLAND 694 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press new ed. 1843) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 514.
271. 12 RAPIN THOYRAS, supra note 168, at 549.
272. 2 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS, THE FOURTH AND
LAST PART. CONTAINING THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS WHICH HAPPENED FROM
THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1645, TO THE DEATH OF KING CHARLES THE
FIRST 1648, at 1341 (London, Chiswell & Cockerill 1701) [hereinafter
RUSHWORTH, FOURTH PART].
273. Id. at 1352.
274. 5 HUME, supra note 167, at 531.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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the matters of Fact against the King, and all other Delinquents.”277
Five days later, the committee reported an ordinance calling for the appointment of commissioners to try Charles for
high treason.278 On January 1, 1649, the House of Commons
passed the ordinance, the prologue of which accused Charles of
having
had a wicked Design totally to subvert the antient and fundamental
Laws and Liberties of this Nation, and in their Trade to introduce an
Arbitrary and Tyrannical Government; and that besides all other evil
Ways and Means to bring this Design to pass, he hath prosecuted it
with Fire and Sword, levyed and maintained a cruel War in the Land
against the Parliament and Kingdom[,] whereby the Country has
been miserably wasted, the publick Treasure exhausted, Trade decayed, Thousands of People murdered, and infinite other Mischiefs
committed; for all which high and Treasonable Offenses the said
Charles Stuart might long since justly have been brought to exemplary and condign Punishment.279

The ordinance also named 150 commissioners—all of them
staunch antiroyalists, including Oliver Cromwell and Colonel
Pride—who were to serve as the judges in the “High Court of
Justice,” which was to try the King.280 The House simultaneously resolved that “by the Fundamental Laws of this Realm
it is Treason in the King of England for the time to come to levy
War against the Parliament and Kingdom of England.”281 This
was novel, indeed—the law of treason had theretofore been definitively established by the Treason Act of 1351, which listed
seven heads of treasonable conduct, none of which included the
King’s levying war against the Parliament.282
When the House of Lords refused to consent to these actions of the Rump House of Commons,283 the Commons unanimously resolved that “whatsoever is enacted and declared Law
by the Commons of England assembled in Parliament, hath the
277. 2 RUSHWORTH, FOURTH PART, supra note 272, at 1370.
278. Id. at 1376.
279. Id. at 1379.
280. Id. at 1379–80.
281. Id. at 1380.
282. The seven heads were as follows: (1) compassing or imagining the
death of the King, Queen, or Crown Prince; (2) “violat[ing]” the Queen, the
wife of the Crown Prince, or the King’s eldest daughter; (3) levying war
against the King in his realm; (4) adhering to the King’s enemies in his realm;
(5) counterfeiting; (6) killing certain royal officials; and (7) petty treason—the
slaying of a master by his servant, a husband by his wife, or a prelate by one
who owes him obedience. Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.).
283. 2 RUSHWORTH, FOURTH PART, supra note 272, at 1382.
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force of Law, and all the People of this Nation are included thereby, although the consent and concurrence of the King and
House of Peers be not had thereunto.”284 This was, of course, a
radical alteration of the English constitution—whereas laws
had previously needed the consent of Commons, Lords, and
Crown, now the Commons, on its own authority, was dispensing with the other two. On January 6, the newly supreme
House of Commons gave its final assent to the ordinance for
trying the King.285
D. THE TRIAL OF CHARLES I
On January 20, 1649, the High Court of Justice assembled
in Westminster Hall, with John Bradshaw presiding as Lord
President of the Court.286 In fact, what the Court was to experience in the coming days was not a trial at all, but rather a series of arguments about jurisdiction, followed by a default
judgment against the defendant. First, the Court’s clerk read
the charge, which accused Charles of making war against Parliament and the people
out of wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and
tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the
rights and liberties of the people; yea, to take away and make void the
foundations thereof and of all redress and remedy of misgovernment,
which by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom were reserved on the people’s behalf, in the right and power of frequent and
successive parliaments.287

The charge ended by “impeach[ing] the said Charles Stuart, as
a Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and a public and implacable Enemy to the Commonwealth of England.”288 Bradshaw asked
Charles how he pled.289 Instead of answering, Charles demanded to “know by what power I am called hither. . . . I would
like to know by what authority, I mean lawful; there are many
unlawful authorities in the world, thieves and robbers by the
highways; but I would know by what authority I was brought
[here].”290 He made clear that his appearance could not be construed as consent to the Court’s jurisdiction, as he was brought

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1384.
Trial of Charles I, 4 Howell’s State Trials 989, 1068 (1649).
Id. at 1070–71.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 995–96.
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there by force.291 And he was certain that the jurisdiction could
not have been vested in the Court by law, as “I see no house of
lords here that may constitute a parliament; and the king too
should have been [here].”292 He thus reiterated, “[l]et me see a
legal authority warranted by the Word of God, the Scriptures,
or warranted by the Constitutions of the kingdom, and I will
answer.”293 Bradshaw replied, “we are satisfied with our authority” and told Charles that, when the Court reconvened in
two days, he would be expected to answer the charge.294 On
Monday, January 22, the Court reconvened, and the prosecution demanded that Charles be made to answer or, if he continued to refuse, that the charge be taken pro confesso.295 Still the
King refused, insisting on being shown a legal basis for the
Court’s jurisdiction,296 and the proceedings were again adjourned.297
The next day, the prosecutor renewed his motion for a
judgment pro confesso.298 Bradshaw again turned to Charles:
You were told, over and over again, That the Court did affirm their
own jurisdiction; that it was not for you, nor any other man, to dispute the jurisdiction of the supreme and highest Authority of England, from which there is no appeal . . . . I do require you, that you
make a positive Answer unto this Charge . . . .299

Charles again refused,300 and Bradshaw at last ordered a default judgment against him.301 Oddly, the commissioners then
assembled in private to hear the witnesses on the merits who
would have testified had the trial proceeded.302 On January 27,
the Court reconvened in public for sentencing, and, after Bradshaw made a long speech laying out Charles’s crimes,303 he announced that the sentence was death by beheading.304 Charles I
was executed on January 30, 1649.305
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 998–99.
Id. at 1000–01.
Id. at 1001–02.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1099–113.
Id. at 1008–17.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1141.
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E. THE MEANING OF CHARLES FOR FRANKLIN
Franklin was clearly of two minds about the execution of
Charles I. On the one hand, Charles was a tyrant, as all good
American patriots of the Founding era knew.306 As early as the
debate over the Petition of Right, members of Parliament referred to Charles’s (and Buckingham’s) actions as tending to
enslave the theretofore free English people.307 Even Hume uses
the language of slavery, tyranny, and usurpation in describing
Charles’s reliance on unconstitutional prerogative taxation.308
The Grand Remonstrance accused Charles of subverting the
constitution,309 and both the ordinance for trying Charles310
and the charge against him311 amplified this accusation. No
less than the charges against Caesar, the charges against
Charles were of subverting the constitution and thereby of converting free citizens into slavish subjects—that is, of destroying
republican liberty. And, like Caesar, Charles had attempted to
maintain this tyranny through a bloody civil war. There is no
doubt that Franklin and his compatriots saw Charles this way;
indeed, in December 1775, as the Revolutionary War was already underway, Franklin penned an anonymous “epitaph” for
John Bradshaw, the presiding judge at Charles’s trial.312 The
epitaph ends with the exhortation, “And never—never forget /
THAT REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO
GOD.”313 On the merits, Charles was a tyrant, and tyrants
ought to be deposed.
But, as we have seen, Charles’s “trial” was not on the merits; it was, rather, a jurisdictional hearing. When Franklin
noted that “[e]very body cried out agst [the trial] as unconstitu-

306. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57.
307. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
308. See supra text accompanying note 241.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 259–60.
310. See supra text accompanying note 279.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 287–88.
312. Benjamin Franklin, “Bradshaw’s Epitaph: A Hoax Attributed to
Franklin,” PA. EVENING POST, Dec. 14, 1775, reprinted in 22 FRANKLIN
PAPERS (William B. Wilcox ed., 1982), supra note 43, at 303, 303–04.
313. Id. So successful was this “epitaph” that the phrase “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God” is even today routinely attributed to Bradshaw
himself. See, e.g., THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 99 (Fred R. Shapiro ed.,
2006). But Franklin appears to be the originator of this line. See Rebellion to
Tyrants Is Obedience to God, 14 WM. & MARY C.Q. HIST. MAG. 37, 37–38
(1905) (quoting a response to a 1905 letter to the editor of the New York Sun
finding no source earlier than Franklin for the quotation).
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tional,”314 he was acknowledging the simple fact that Charles
had the better of the jurisdictional arguments. The English
constitution demanded the assent of Commons, Lords, and
Crown to a bill before it became law, yet the House of Commons
dispensed with that requirement and passed the ordinance establishing the High Court of Justice on its own.315 The Commons also redefined treason and applied the new definition to
Charles, ex post facto, on its own authority.316 And, of course,
the House of Commons that did all of these things was not the
duly elected House of the Long Parliament, but rather the
purged House of the Rump Parliament.317 Moreover, the ordinance establishing the Court itself announced the defendant’s
guilt,318 and the commissioners were chosen by name, specifically to sit in judgment in this one case.319 None of this was
constitutional.320
Indeed, the only honest answer to Charles’s demand to
know by what legal authority he was tried would have been to
admit that there was no legal authority, that this was a revolutionary act. After all, Charles himself acknowledged that “there
are many unlawful authorities in the world, thieves and robbers by the highways,”321 and to this list he might have added
revolutionaries. Revolutionary acts are, by definition, ultra
vires—this does not make them substantively unjust (certainly,
Franklin and his fellow revolutionaries were in no position to
declare revolution unjust tout court), but it does make them
procedurally irregular. Charles’s refusal to plead—that is, his
refusal to pretend as if the normal legal forms applied—laid
bare the revolutionary nature of the regicides’ act.322
314. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 283–85.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 281–82.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 274–77.
318. See supra text accompanying note 279.
319. See supra text accompanying note 280.
320. Geoffrey Robertson has recently attempted to make the case that
Charles’s trial was “an oasis of justice and fairness.” GEOFFREY ROBERTSON,
THE TYRANNICIDE BRIEF: THE STORY OF THE MAN WHO SENT CHARLES I TO
THE SCAFFOLD 3 (2005); see also id. at 163, 189, 202 (claiming that the trial
was both legitimate and legal). Robertson’s case is built entirely on his disdain
for Charles and his contention that Charles received more procedural rights at
trial than other defendants of the time. But, of course, this is wholly unresponsive to the criticisms that the court had no jurisdiction to try Charles in
the first place and that he broke no existing law.
321. See supra text accompanying note 290.
322. See Cover, supra note 134, at 1607 & n.17 (noting the legitimating
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In short, the regicides of Charles I were little different
than the assassins of Caesar. In both cases, political actors asserted an alternative constitutional vision in the medium of
blood. In both cases, support for that bloody act can only be
based on the substantive validity of their justifications, for in
neither case can the killers make a plausible claim to have followed the forms of procedural justice. As we have seen, in both
cases, Franklin and his colleagues accepted the substantive
justice of their revolutionary forebearers’ actions.
Moreover, in both cases, the killers’ claims of substantive
justice are bolstered by several other factors. First, there was
no procedurally regular way of achieving the same ends: much
as Caesar had, through violence and intimidation, neutralized
all legal opposition, and much as Charles had, by dissolution
and prorogation, prevented the impeachment of Buckingham,
so too did the existing constitutional structures make the removal of the King illegal. And second, in both cases, the killers
acted openly: just as Brutus and his compatriots marched
through the streets in their bloody clothes proclaiming the return of liberty, so too the regicides did their deed in public, with
an audience, and under their own names. Even Felton chose to
act in public and carried on him a written justification, in case
he died in the attempt. Franklin and his contemporaries, then,
accepted not only that Caesar, Buckingham, and Charles all
aimed at the destruction of republican liberty, but also that,
under the circumstances, this tyranny justified the resort to extra-legal violence.
But successful revolutionaries are rarely permanent revolutionaries. Franklin and his colleagues, having won their independence, now sought to create a constitution which would
both instantiate substantive republican justice and create procedures allowing for a nonrevolutionary response to substantive injustices. An American Caesar or Charles would deserve
to be deposed, just as the Roman and English versions did—
this is why Franklin drew a substantive link between impeachment and assassination. But America would have in place
procedures for deposing obnoxious magistrates, up to and including the chief magistrate. And American legislatures would
not be prorogueable or dissolvable by the president, except in

function played by defendants’ seeming acquiescence in their trials, and the
disruptive potential of a defendant who refuses to play along).

388

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:347

rare cases323—indeed, the Constitution, by explicitly exempting
impeachments from the pardon power,324 makes it clear that
the chief magistrate may not override the impeachment
process. Thus, the Constitution makes it very clear that the
American chief magistrate can do wrong, and it provides measures for calling him to account.325 Charles’s jurisdictional objections would thus have no purchase in America. Moreover, an
American Charles would not be able to protect himself or his
favorite by dismissing Congress. An American Buckingham
would be impeached, and no president could prevent this
through parliamentary maneuvering. Assassinability thus provides the substantive law of presidential impeachability, while
the Constitution’s procedural innovations domesticate the
process, making it less violent, less disruptive, and less errorprone.
Subsequent events would demonstrate the wisdom of the
Constitution’s innovations. The procedural improvements of
impeachment over assassination can perhaps best be observed
by looking at a historical moment in which the two occurred in
short order: the assassination of President Lincoln and the impeachment of President Johnson.
III. LINCOLN AND BOOTH; JOHNSON AND THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS
A. LINCOLN AND BOOTH
In November 1864, shortly after the reelection of Abraham
Lincoln and in the midst of General Sherman’s march to the
sea, a production of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar was staged at
the Winter Garden theater on Broadway to raise money for a
statue of the Bard to be placed in Central Park.326 The leading
323. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that the President may adjourn the houses of Congress “to such Time as he shall think proper” only “in
Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment”). Even in such a case, the adjournment could not last indefinitely. See
id. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year . . . .”); id. amend. XX, § 2 (same).
324. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President “shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment”).
325. See id. art. II, § 4 (providing for presidential impeachment).
326. See GORDON SAMPLES, LUST FOR FAME: THE STAGE CAREER OF JOHN
WILKES BOOTH 162–65 (1982) (describing the production). The evening raised
nearly $4000, id. at 162, and the statue, by sculptor John Quincy Adams Ward,
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roles were played by three brothers, sons of one of the greatest
tragedians of the nineteenth century.327 Edwin Booth played
Brutus; Junius Brutus Booth, Jr., played Cassius; and John
Wilkes Booth played Mark Antony.328 This was not the first
time that John Wilkes Booth had played in Shakespeare’s tyrannicidal tragedy: he had first performed in Julius Caesar in
1857 at the age of nineteen,329 and it was a staple of his repertoire thereafter.330 Booth had literally “acted over” Caesar’s
death in a “state[] unborn and accent[] yet unknown” when
Caesar was assassinated, and he had internalized the nobility
of the act that Cassius boasted would lead the assassins to be
called “[t]he men that gave their country liberty.”331
The nobility of tyrannicide was hardly a stretch for Booth.
As one commentator has noted, he was born into a family with
a “reverence for libertarian heroes.”332 Indeed, one need look no
further than the family’s names for this to become apparent.
Booth’s father and eldest brother were both named Junius Brutus Booth, an homage to the assassin of the last Tarquin monarch, founder of the Roman Republic, and ancestor of Marcus
Brutus.333 John Wilkes Booth was himself named after John
Wilkes, a British member of Parliament and political agitator
who, in the 1760s and 1770s, became a champion for individual
rights in the face of a hostile Crown and parliamentary majority.334 Booth, who received a strong classical education, was in a
good position to appreciate the resonance of these names.335
still stands in the Park’s “Literary Walk” on the east side of the Park at 66th
Street.
327. Years after seeing Junius Brutus Booth, Sr. play Richard III, Whitman would recall that “his genius was to me one of the grandest revelations of
my life, a lesson of artistic expression. The words fire, energy, abandon, found
in him unprecedented meanings.” WALT WHITMAN, The Old Bowery, in 2
PROSE WORKS 1892, at 591, 597 (Floyd Stovall ed., 1964); see also ALBERT
FURTWANGLER, ASSASSIN ON STAGE: BRUTUS, HAMLET, AND THE DEATH OF
LINCOLN 54 (1991) (referring to the elder Booth as “an international star” who
“was the leading American tragedian” for three decades).
328. SAMPLES, supra note 326, at 162.
329. See id. at 197 (noting performances in Caesar on October 28 and 31,
1857, in Philadelphia).
330. See, e.g., id. at 211, 214, 223–24 (noting subsequent performances in
Caesar).
331. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 3, sc. 1, ll. 111–18; see also supra
text accompanying note 115.
332. FURTWANGLER, supra note 327, at 57.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.
334. After Wilkes published a pamphlet attacking the Crown, Lord Halifax,
the Secretary of State, issued a general warrant for the arrest and seizure of
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But if Booth inherited a family tradition which lionized resistance to arbitrary rule (and a family penchant for the dramatic), he was also imbued with the values of the place of his
birth: rural Maryland.336 Maryland was a slave state with significant Confederate sympathies—Lincoln received only about
2200 of the 90,000 or so presidential votes cast in the state in
1860.337 On the advice of Pinkerton detectives, the D.C. militia,
and his Secretary of State-designate—all of whom had specific
fears about his safety—Lincoln travelled through Maryland secretly in the middle of the night on the way to his inauguration.338 After Fort Sumter, when Lincoln sent out his first call
for military volunteers, Maryland provided none; hundreds of
Marylanders, instead, enlisted in Virginia regiments.339 And
when Union volunteers from Massachusetts passed through
Baltimore on their way to Washington, they were attacked by a
mob and forced to fight their way out, killing twelve civilians in
the process.340 In retaliation, the governor of Maryland ordered
that several railroad bridges be burned to prevent more Union
troops from coming through Baltimore.341
As that last example makes clear, Maryland was not only a
state with deeply ambivalent feelings toward the Union; it was
the papers of the author of the pamphlet. Wilkes successfully sued both the
searching officer and Lord Halifax for trespass on the grounds that the warrant was illegal. Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1406 (1769);
Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1153 (1763); see also AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11–14, 16–17, 21, 29
(1997) (describing Wilkes’s impact on the development of the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures). Both houses of Parliament later declared
Wilkes guilty of contempt, and, although the voters continued electing Wilkes
to his seat in the House of Commons, the Commons refused to seat him between 1768 and 1774. In 1774, however, the House bowed to overwhelming
public pressure and seated him. See CHAFETZ, supra note 4, at 155–58 (discussing Wilkes’s conflicts with Parliament). For an account of Wilkes’s life, see
generally ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL
LIBERTY (2006). For a description of the American lionization of Wilkes, see
generally Pauline Maier, John Wilkes and American Disillusionment with
Britain, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 373 (1963).
335. See MICHAEL W. KAUFFMAN, AMERICAN BRUTUS: JOHN WILKES
BOOTH AND THE LINCOLN CONSPIRACIES 86–87, 92–93, 200 (2004) (discussing
Booth’s education and his familiarity with the names).
336. Id. at 81–82.
337. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 7 (1998).
338. Id. at 6–7.
339. KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 116.
340. REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 20–21.
341. Id. at 21.
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also a state of special strategic importance. With Virginia serving as capital of the Confederacy, Maryland was all that connected Washington, D.C., to the rest of the Union. Secession by
Maryland would leave the Union capital surrounded and isolated. It is therefore not surprising that some of Lincoln’s war
policies fell hardest on Maryland. In April 1861, he authorized
General Scott to suspend habeas corpus at any point on or near
rail lines used by the military between Philadelphia and Washington.342 Within a month, John Merryman was arrested by
Union troops in a Baltimore suburb for participating in the destruction of the railroad bridges.343 Chief Justice Taney, riding
circuit, granted Merryman’s habeas petition on the grounds
that Lincoln had no authority to suspend the writ;344 as Taney
himself noted, though, he was “resisted by a force too strong for
[him] to overcome,”345 and Merryman was held by the military
for several more months.346 Nor was Merryman the only Marylander held without charges by military authorities: a number
of Confederate-supporting Maryland legislators were arrested
to keep them from introducing a secession resolution,347 as
were disloyal newspaper publishers,348 and plenty of others.349
The constitutionality of Lincoln’s various wartime measures has been extensively debated,350 and it is not my purpose
to enter into such debates here. What is hard to dispute, however, is that, in the words of two recent commentators, “Lincoln
. . . wielded more raw, unilateral power than any president in

342. Id. at 25 (reprinting the order to General Scott).
343. Id. at 26.
344. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144 –45, 152–53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)
(No. 9487).
345. Id. at 153.
346. REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 38–39.
347. Id. at 45.
348. Id. at 46.
349. See Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Lincoln Administration and Arbitrary Arrests: A Reconsideration, 5 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 6, 8 (1983) (noting the
large number of civilian arrests); id. at 13 (noting that Marylanders were disproportionately among those arrested).
350. See generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003);
JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed.
1964); REHNQUIST, supra note 337, at 3–169; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1120–26 (defending Lincoln’s constitutional vision of the indissolubility of the Union); William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J.
1807, 1853–61 (2008) (defending Lincoln’s suspension of habeas and his disregard of Taney’s Merryman opinion).
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American history, before or since.”351 Especially to those who
doubted the constitutionality of preserving the Union by
force352 or of freeing the South’s slaves,353 Lincoln’s vigorous actions were bound to seem particularly objectionable. And object
many did.
The Southern press was, of course, vitriolic,354 and residents of the border states might well have had access to newspapers like the Richmond Dispatch, which compared the
Emancipation Proclamation to Caesar’s defiance of the tribune
Mettellus355 and thundered that the rule of law was no safer in
the North “than it had [been] in Rome when the whole republic
was writhing in the iron grasp of the great Dictator. . . . Those
who were once [Lincoln’s] fellow citizens, are now his timid and
abject slaves.”356 But one need not look to the Confederate press
to find such forceful denunciations of Lincoln; the Copperhead

351. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 173 (2008).
352. Louisiana Senator Judah Benjamin (later to serve in a number of cabinet positions in the Confederacy) told his colleagues in December of 1860 that
“[t]hese States, parties to the compact [i.e., the Constitution], have a right to
withdraw from it, by virtue of its own provisions, when those provisions are
violated by the other parties to the compact, when either powers not granted
are usurped, or rights are refused that are especially granted to the States.”
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 2D SESS. 215 (1860). And it was not simply Southerners who took the position that the federal government had no authority to
prevent secession—President Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian, made the same argument in his final State of the Union message to Congress. James Buchanan,
Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1860), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 626, 635–36 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS] (arguing that the federal government has no power “to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn” from the Union). For the
Lincoln-esque rejoinder to Benjamin and Buchanan, see Amar, supra note 350,
at 1120–26.
353. See FARBER, supra note 350, at 152–57 (discussing the constitutional
debates attendant on the Emancipation Proclamation).
354. See generally Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Anti-Lincoln Tradition, 4 J.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 6, 8–10 (1982) (noting that the image of Lincoln in
the Southern press in the 1860s “bears a striking resemblance to the American
image of Adolf Hitler in the 1940s”).
355. Editorial, The Twin Proclamations, RICHMOND DISPATCH, Oct. 2,
1862, reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A PRESS PORTRAIT 315, 315 (Herbert
Mitgang ed., 2000) [hereinafter PRESS PORTRAIT] (stating that Northerners
“are learning, in its full force, the meaning of Julius Caesar’s terrible saying,
‘inter arma silent leges’”). On Caesar and Mettellus, see supra text accompanying notes 81–83.
356. The Twin Proclamations, supra note 355, at 315.
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press in the North was every bit as strident.357 A New York
newspaper asserted in 1861 that “Mr. Lincoln is evidently a believer in the savageries of old Europe, and thinks that the only
way to ‘save the Union’ is to resort to the bayonet.”358 At a
Democratic meeting in New York in 1863, one speaker declared
that “[s]tep by step had Abe Lincoln departed from his promises
until by gradations of infamy he sat on a kingly throne and aspired to a regal crown,” to which the crowd responded, “Hang
him.”359 Another speaker declared that “[l]oyalty to Abraham
Lincoln was treason to the Constitution” and threatened that,
in time, Lincoln “would see how treason in reality would be
punished.”360 A third speaker was even more explicit, echoing
Patrick Henry’s speech on the eve of the American Revolution:
“Caesar had his Brutus, . . . Charles I had his Cromwell, and
the George III. of the present day might profit by their example.”361 By 1864, a New York paper declared that “the masses of
the North are witnessing the transformation of their Government to absolutism. Their liberties vanish, their rights are ignored.”362 Weeks later, the same paper asked, simply, “By
whom and when was Abraham Lincoln made dictator in this
country?”363
In Wisconsin, Marcus Mills Pomeroy repeatedly used his
La Crosse Democrat to attack Lincoln as a “tyrant” and “despot” who had instituted a “reign of terror” and had “warred
against the Constitution.”364 In an 1863 editorial, Pomeroy
357. Lincoln also took heated criticism from Republicans who thought he
was prepared to make too many concessions to the South and was too dismissive of congressional power. For example, the 1864 Wade-Davis Manifesto,
published in Horace Greeley’s New-York Daily Tribune, accused Lincoln of exercising “plenary dictatorial power” in contravention of congressional authority. B.F. Wade & H. Winter Davis, To the Supporters of the Government, N.Y.
DAILY TRIB., Aug. 5, 1864, at 5. See generally Fehrenbacher, supra note 354, at
12–13 (describing the Radical Republicans’ attacks on Lincoln).
358. Editorial, How Mr. Lincoln May Restore Peace to the Country, N.Y.
EVENING DAY-BOOK, Apr. 18, 1861, reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note
355, at 261, 261.
359. Fernando Wood’s Peace Meeting, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., May 19, 1863, at 8.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Editorial, Mr. Lincoln’s Treachery, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 10, 1864,
reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 369, 371.
363. Editorial, He Can’t Do It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 1864, reprinted
in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 379, 379.
364. See Frank Klement, A Small-Town Editor Criticizes Lincoln: A Study
in Editorial Abuse, 54 LINCOLN HERALD 27, 28, 30 (1952) (quoting Pomeroy’s
editorials in the Democrat).
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prayed for Lincoln’s death,365 and after Lincoln was reelected,
Pomeroy wrote of his willingness to assassinate him.366 In Lincoln’s home state, the Chicago Times called the Emancipation
Proclamation “a monstrous usurpation, a criminal wrong, and
an act of national suicide.”367 The Illinois State Register responded to Lincoln’s 1864 reelection campaign by declaring
that Lincoln’s administration had
tricked the country into a war, which it has proved itself incapable of
prosecuting successfully or concluding honorably. It has violated the
rights of the people, in a manner, which, in any other country, would
have provoked a revolution. The most powerful monarchy in Europe
would not dare commit the outrages which have been put upon us by
the Lincoln administration. . . . The surrender of personal rights, and
the establishment of an erratic, irresponsible despotism, does not help
the cause of the Union a particle . . . . The doom of Lincoln and black
republicanism is sealed . . . [a]nd the would be despots at Washington
must succumb to their fate.368

The Indianapolis Daily Sentinel reprinted an editorial from the
Times of London369 that declared that Lincoln “governed
. . . with a revolutionary freedom from the trammels of law”
and “carried on a war with a barbarity at which the world has
stood amazed, destroying harbors, burning river side towns,
putting the inhabitants of captured places to hard labor, contrary to all the laws of war, and even wreaking a shameless

365. Id. at 28.
366. Id. at 32.
367. Editorial, The Emancipation Proclamation, CHI. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1862, reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 303, 304.
368. Editorial, The End of Lincoln, ILL. ST. REG., Aug. 7, 1864, reprinted in
PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 406, 406–07.
369. The British newspapers were especially vicious toward Lincoln. See,
e.g., Editorial, TIMES (London), Nov. 22, 1864, at 6 (declaring Lincoln’s reelection “an avowed step towards the foundation of a military despotism, towards
the subversion of a popular Government, which may still exist in form, but
which in substance is gone”); Editorial, TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 1862, at 8
(declaring Lincoln to be “among that catalogue of monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind”); see also Fehrenbacher, supra note 354, at
14 (noting that London’s Evening Standard referred to Lincoln as the “most
despicable tyrant of modern days”).
The hostility of the London newspapers was but one manifestation of
broader hostility in London society toward Lincoln and the Union cause. As
Henry Adams, who spent the War in London as private secretary to his father,
Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister to the Court of St. James,
noted, “[t]he copperhead was at home in Pall Mall.” HENRY ADAMS, THE
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 117 (Library of America 1990) (1907); see also
id. at 124 –25 (describing the “demented” belief in London society of the “brutality” and “ferocity” of Lincoln and Seward).
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vengeance on women.”370 The editorial went on to refer to the
Lincoln Administration as “Washington terrorists” and declared that, although “[a] brilliant despotism may blind a nation for a time, . . . a Government that is at once tyrannical and
stupid cannot long avert its overthrow.”371 In Booth’s home
state, the aptly named newspaper The South responded to Lincoln’s 1861 request to Congress for troops and supply by declaring him to be “the equal, in despotic wickedness, of Nero or any
of the other tyrants who have polluted this earth.”372
By the time of Lincoln’s 1864 reelection campaign, the New
York Times had ample evidence of
the unexampled abuse which has been poured upon the Administration for the last two years. No living man was ever charged with political crimes of such multiplicity and such enormity as ABRAHAM
LINCOLN. He has been denounced without end as a perjurer, a usurper, a tyrant, a subverter of the Constitution, a destroyer of the liberties of his country, a reckless desperado, a heartless trifler over the
last agonies of an expiring nation. Had that which has been said of
him been true there is no circle in DANTE’S Inferno full enough of
torment to expiate his iniquities.373

Although the Times went on to conclude that the charges were
false and that “the guilt rests not with ABRAHAM LINCOLN, but
with his railers,”374 it was the “railers” who had the ear of John
Wilkes Booth.
In a draft of a speech (which he never delivered) written
shortly after Lincoln’s election, Booth made clear both his views
on slavery—“[I]nstead of looking upon slavery as a sin[,] . . . I
hold it to be a happiness for themselves and a social & political
blessing for us. . . . I have been through the whole South and
have marked the happiness of master & of man”375—and on the
“trators [sic]” who “preach the Abolition doctrine.”376 His brother Edwin reported Booth’s belief that “Lincoln would be made

370. Editorial, President Lincoln’s Arbitrary Arrests. Opinion of the London
Times, INDIANAPOLIS DAILY SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 1862, at 2.
371. Id.
372. Editorial, Lincoln and His Wants, THE SOUTH (Baltimore), July 8,
1861, reprinted in PRESS PORTRAIT, supra note 355, at 267, 268.
373. The Recent State Conventions—Movements for President Lincoln, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1864, at 4.
374. Id.
375. John Wilkes Booth, Draft of a Speech (Dec. 1860), in “RIGHT OR
WRONG, GOD JUDGE ME”: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN WILKES BOOTH 55, 62 (John
Rhodehamel & Louise Taper eds., 1997).
376. Id. at 56.
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king of America,”377 and his sister Asia reported a more extended outburst:
[Lincoln] is made the tool of the North, to crush out, or try to crush
out slavery, by robbery, rapine, slaughter and bought armies. . . . He
is Bonaparte in one great move, that is, by overturning this blind Republic and making himself a king. This man’s re-election which will
follow his success, I tell you, will be a reign! . . . You’ll see, you’ll see
that re-election means succession.378

Lincoln, like Caesar before him, wanted to be king. Republican
liberty required a savior. And, like Brutus, Booth saw himself
as having a hereditary obligation to stamp out tyranny. After
all, was he not also the heir of a Junius Brutus?379 Was he not
also named for a hero in the cause of liberty?380 Was Booth
himself not the rightful heir of the tyrannicides and regicides
he had studied and acted?
Booth made a point of playing up his connections to Brutus. He intended to kill Lincoln on April 13, 1865381—the Ides
of April.382 (In one of the great symbolic ironies of American
history, Lincoln stayed home with a headache on April 13.383
The assassination was thus postponed to the next day—Good
Friday—thereby linking Lincoln not with Caesar, but with
Christ.)384 The act was consciously done in public, in front of an
audience.385 And Booth followed his shot by leaping to the stage
and yelling, “Sic semper tyrannis!”386—the use of Latin, if not
the actual words, calling upon Roman republicanism.387 Booth
377. Letter from Edwin Booth to Nahum Capen (July 28, 1881), in EDWINA
BOOTH GROSSMAN, EDWIN BOOTH: RECOLLECTION BY HIS DAUGHTER (reprint
1969) (1894), quoted in FURTWANGLER, supra note 327, at 49.
378. ASIA BOOTH CLARKE, JOHN WILKES BOOTH: A SISTER’S MEMOIR 88
(Terry Alford ed., 1996).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 101–08 (noting the importance of
Brutus’s descent from Junius Brutus); supra text accompanying note 333 (noting that Booth’s father was named for Junius Brutus).
380. See supra note 334 and accompanying text (noting that Booth was
named for John Wilkes).
381. KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 212.
382. In the Roman calendar, the ides are the fifteenth of March, May, July,
and October, and the thirteenth of every other month. See 7 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 622 (2d ed. 1989).
383. KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 215.
384. See id. at 217.
385. Id. at 212.
386. Id. at 7.
387. The phrase does not occur in any of the Roman sources on the assassination of Caesar, but there is a “pseudo-classical tradition” that Brutus uttered it while stabbing Caesar. Francois Jost, John Wilkes Booth and Abraham Lincoln: The Re-enactment of a Murder, 93 MLN 503, 504 (1978). Since
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also sought to learn from Brutus’s mistake: by allowing Antony
and Octavius to live, Brutus ultimately undercut his aim of restoring republican liberty. Booth would make no such mistake.
At the same time he was assassinating Lincoln, his colleagues
were dispatched to kill Vice President Andrew Johnson and
Secretary of State William Seward.388 (Seward would survive
the vicious attack,389 while the conspirator tasked with killing
Johnson lost his nerve and spent the evening drinking instead.)390
After Booth’s dramatic leap to the stage, he ran out the
back door of Ford’s Theater, grabbed his waiting horse, and
took flight.391 Like Felton before him,392 Booth took steps to ensure that written justification of his actions would be circulated. As news of the assassination spread, a friend of Booth’s
remembered that Booth had handed him a letter the previous
day and asked him to see that it was published in the National
Intelligencer.393 The letter asserted that, “Many will blame me
for what I am about to do, but posterity, I am sure, will justify
me.”394 Booth’s sister also recalled that he had left a package
with her; inside was a letter to Booth’s mother, in which he insisted that
[f ]or four years I have lived (I may say) a slave in the north (a favored
slave its [sic] true, but no less hateful to me on that account.) . . . I
cannot longer resist the inclination to go and share the sufferings of
my brave countrymen, holding an unequal strife (for every right human & divine) against the most ruthless enemy, the world has ever
known.395

Also in the package was another letter, this one meant to be
published as a justification of the assassination.396 Here, he asserted that “[t]he very nomination of Abraham Lincoln [in
1860], spoke plainly, war—war upon Southern rights and insti1776, “Sic semper tyrannis” has been Virginia’s state motto and appears at the
bottom of its seal. See generally W. Edwin Hemphill, The Symbolism of Our
Seal, 2 VA. CAVALCADE, Winter 1952, at 27.
388. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 214 –15.
389. Id. at 22–27.
390. Id. at 225, 228.
391. Id. at 226–27.
392. See supra text accompanying note 227.
393. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 230.
394. Letter from John Wilkes Booth to John Mathews, in KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 230.
395. Letter from John Wilkes Booth to Mary Ann Holmes Booth, in
KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 252–53.
396. Letter from John Wilkes Booth (1864), in CLARKE, supra note 378, at
106–10.
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tutions.”397 He went on to describe slavery as “one of the greatest blessings (both for themselves and us) that God ever bestowed upon a favored nation”398 and abolitionists as “the only
traitors in the land.”399
Booth continued to write apologia even as he was on the
run. In a journal entry, he lamented his hunted status:
And why; For doing what Brutus was honored for, what made Tell a
Hero. And yet I for striking down a greater tyrant than they ever
knew am looked upon as a common cutthroat. My action was purer
than either of theirs. . . . A country groaned beneath this tyranny and
prayed for this end. Yet now behold the cold hand they extend to
me.400

Booth, in his own mind, was just like Brutus—only better, for
he struck down a greater tyrant, and with purer motives. Booth
was certain that Lincoln sought to become king; he was certain
that Lincoln had no right to go to war and no right to free the
South’s slaves; and he was certain that Lincoln had no right to
suspend habeas corpus, arrest Southern partisans, and try
them before military commissions. Like the opponents of Caesar and Charles before him, Booth believed that Lincoln’s innovations in government had reduced himself and his compatriots
to the status of bondsmen.401 In short, to Booth it was pellucidly clear that Lincoln had subverted the Constitution, exercised
tyrannical power unconstrained by law, and prosecuted a
bloody civil war in which more than 600,000 soldiers perished.402 And Booth was not alone in these views—as we have
seen, editorial writers and orators from New York to Illinois to
Indiana, not to mention those of the Confederacy, shared these
views. But were these not the very crimes for which Caesar and
Charles died? Booth, who had played Antony the previous year
at the Winter Garden, was certain that this time he had “acted
over” Brutus’s “lofty scene”—and he was hurt that his countrymen were not lining up to celebrate him as “[t]he m[a]n that
gave [his] country liberty.”403

397. Id. at 107.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 108.
400. John Wilkes Booth, Diary Entry (April 13–14, 1865), in KAUFFMAN,
supra note 335, at 400.
401. See supra text accompanying note 395.
402. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, DRAWN WITH THE SWORD: REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 56 (1996) (putting the total number of combatant deaths at 620,000).
403. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 44, act 3, sc. 1, ll. 111–18.
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Booth was, in fact, using the correct standard. A chief magistrate who subverted the Constitution, aggrandized his own
power, reduced his fellow citizens to the status of slaves, and
prosecuted a devastating and unnecessary civil war was a tyrant and deserved to be removed from power. This was the lesson that not only Booth, but the American Founding generation
as well, took from Caesar and Charles. To Franklin and his colleagues, not only was this the correct standard for the removal
of a chief magistrate, but it was also the case that the Roman
tyrannicides and the English regicides had properly applied
this standard—Caesar and Charles were, on the merits, tyrants. Still, Franklin and his compatriots knew well the fallibility of human judgment and decided therefore to append a procedural mechanism—impeachment—to this substantive
standard. It was this procedural mechanism that John Wilkes
Booth, in his epistemic hubris, circumvented.
And Booth, of course, was substantively mistaken.404
Whatever one’s judgment on the constitutional merits of any
particular action of Lincoln’s, he was no tyrant—if nothing else,
his insistence on submitting his actions to Congress405 and on
404. To call this a “mistake” may be to give Booth too much credit. Unlike
Brutus or the regicides, Booth did not present his actions to the polity for their
judgment; rather, he immediately went on the lam. This may indicate that he
did not believe that his claim to have acted for the public good could withstand
public scrutiny.
405. Within days of the Battle of Fort Sumter, Lincoln summoned a special
session of Congress to meet on July 4, 1861. See Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Apr. 15, 1861), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 13, 13.
As James McPherson has noted, July was the earliest that Congress could realistically be assembled. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR: ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 23–24 (2008). He explained,
Th[e] delay [between the beginning of the war and the meeting of the
special session] was not the result of Lincoln’s desire to prosecute the
war without congressional interference, as several historians have
suggested. Rather, it was a consequence of the electoral calendar at
that time. . . . [S]everal states held their congressional elections in the
spring of odd-numbered years. In 1861 seven states remaining in the
Union held their congressional elections from March to June. Thus
the special session could not meet until all representatives had been
elected.
Id.
When Congress had assembled, Lincoln explained the state of the war and
his actions in the months since he took office. Although he argued for the constitutionality of all of his actions, he also insisted that he acted, “trusting then,
as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing
has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.” Abraham
Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 352, at 20, 24.
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holding the 1864 election demonstrates that.406 Booth’s substantive mistake highlights the wisdom of the Constitution’s
proceduralized alternative to assassination. Booth and his
Copperhead fellow travelers not only had the opportunity to defeat Lincoln at the ballot box, they also had the opportunity to
impeach him. If Lincoln truly was a tyrant bent on waging a
cruel war in order to solidify his power and enslave the nation,
then why not present these facts to Congress, a forum in which
Lincoln would have the “opportunity of vindicating his character”?407 If Booth and his compatriots could convince the House
and Senate that they were right, then Lincoln would be removed and the specter of tyranny would have passed. Unlike
Caesar, Lincoln had not disbanded the institutions meant to
check him; unlike Charles, he had no power to dismiss the legislature and thereby foil its intentions. Of course, the simple
answer is that Congress had no intention of impeaching and
removing President Lincoln—that is to say, Congress did not
believe that the Copperhead charge of tyranny was correct. Indeed, we can go further: the conduct of the war was the issue in
the 1862 and 1864 congressional elections. The fact that the
Copperheads did not control more seats in Congress was therefore evidence that the American people—those remaining in
the Union, at least—did not regard Lincoln as a tyrant. In this
judgment, the American people, and their representatives in
Congress, were correct.408

As one historian has summarized,
Lincoln was asking Congress to validate what he had done; he did not
claim authority to act arbitrarily in cases where the Constitution
spoke delphically. His request for congressional endorsement offered
to share authority, to involve both branches of government in meeting
the crisis. Lincoln wanted a constitutional process in dialogue, not in
conflict.
PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 80–81 (1994).
This eagerness to engage in constitutional dialogue is the antithesis of tyranny.
406. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 146
(2005) (“[I]n the middle of a great civil war, Lincoln presided over a fair election on schedule in 1864, even though for much of the campaign he had expected to lose this contest, and its result threatened to unravel everything that
he had done in office.”).
407. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 65.
408. It should not be entirely surprising that the deliberate judgment of a
large group is superior to the judgment of a lone individual. Cf. Josh Chafetz,
Book Note, It’s the Aggregation, Stupid!, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 577 (2005)
(reviewing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004), and discussing the literature on crowd wisdom).
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The combination of Booth’s mistake in judgment and his
lack of epistemic humility led to the political tragedy and personal injustice that was America’s first presidential assassination. The controversy surrounding Lincoln’s successor in office
would further point to the wisdom of a procedural mechanism
for executive removal.
B. JOHNSON AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS
Although Lincoln has been widely applauded for putting
together a cabinet consisting of a “Team of Rivals” to shepherd
the nation through the Civil War,409 it was his choice in 1864 of
a War Democrat, Andrew Johnson, as his vice president that
was to lead to the next crisis over executive removal.410 In the
midst of a grave national crisis, Johnson came into the presidency with no independent electoral mandate and with both
houses of Congress controlled by the Republicans. This was a
tricky situation, to say the least, and tact was never one of
Johnson’s strong suits.411 And so it was that less than three
years after the Lincoln assassination, Booth’s surviving coconspirators were asked if they had any incriminating evidence
against Johnson that would aid the House of Representatives
in its drive to impeach him.412 They had no evidence to give—
Johnson had nothing to do with the assassination413—but it is
indicative of how much Radical Republicans in Congress despised Johnson that they sought to make common cause with
the assassins of Lincoln against him.
What had Johnson done to cause this animus? There is no
doubt that, from early in his presidency, he was at loggerheads
with Congress over fundamental questions about Reconstruction. As early as the summer of 1865, congressional Republicans were unhappy that Johnson was not more aggressive in
409. See generally DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE
POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005).
410. Although there is some debate as to how involved Lincoln was in the
choice of his running mate in 1864, at a minimum it is clear that he was not
opposed to Johnson. See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON: A
BIOGRAPHY 177–79 (1989).
411. See id. at 54 (“A pronounced streak of stubbornness was characteristic
of Johnson in politics as well as in personal relations.”).
412. Four of Booth’s co-conspirators were sentenced to prison terms in the
Dry Tortugas, a remote island chain at the end of the Florida Keys. See
KAUFFMAN, supra note 335, at 376. In 1867, they were contacted there and
asked if they had any incriminating evidence on Johnson. See id. at 380.
413. Id.
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confiscating the land of former Confederates.414 Early the next
year, Johnson vetoed both the Freedman’s Bureau Bill and the
Civil Rights Act;415 the latter veto was subsequently overridden
by Congress.416 In the message accompanying his veto of the
Freedman’s Bureau Bill, Johnson did not limit himself to disputing the Bill’s wisdom and constitutionality;417 he went on to
suggest that no legislation affecting the South should pass until
the Southern states were readmitted to Congress.418 The Republican response to Johnson’s vetoes was furious. The Rochester, New York, Democrat editorialized that Johnson’s “objections are captious and pettifogging, and exhibit no sincere
desire to coöperate in the work which Congress has undertaken. He assumes the attitude and repeats the arguments of the
Democratic leaders.”419 The Delaware State Journal somberly
noted that “[s]ince the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, no
public event has more deeply saddened the hearts and called
forth the condemnation of the Union men of the State of Delaware” than Johnson’s vetoes.420 The Washington Chronicle declared that the Freedman’s Bureau Bill veto message “will fall
like the cold hand of death upon the warm impulses of the
American people.”421 And the Chicago Tribune called upon “the
masses of the loyal people [to] rise against this veto of a measure intended as a bulwark against Slavery and treason, as they
rose in their might when the flag of the Union was first hauled
down from Fort Sumter.”422 Members of Congress, too, reacted
harshly to the vetoes.423

414. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW
JOHNSON 203 (1992).
415. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 287–
90, 314 –15 (1960).
416. Id. at 323–24.
417. Although he certainly did question them. See Andrew Johnson, Veto
Message (Feb. 19, 1866), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 398,
398–403.
418. See id. at 403–05.
419. Quoted in The Republican Press on the Veto Message, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 3,
1866, at 9.
420. Quoted in id.
421. Quoted in id.
422. Quoted in id.
423. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 931–32 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade on the veto of the Freedman’s Bureau Bill); id. at
936–43 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull on same); id. at 1832–37 (statement of Rep. William Lawrence on the Civil Rights Bill).
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Johnson, characteristically, responded to the criticism by
lashing out. In an hour-long speech outside the White House to
a cheering Democratic crowd, he equated the Radical Republicans in Congress with the Southern secessionists:
I look upon them . . . as being as much opposed to the fundamental
principles of this government, and believe they are as much laboring
to prevent or destroy them as were the men who fought against us. (A
Voice—“What are the names?”) I say Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania—(tremendous applause)—I say Charles Sumner—(great applause). I say Wendell Phillips and others of the same stripe are
among them.424

With such heated rhetoric on both sides, it was almost inevitable that the clash would continue to escalate.
Emboldened by the 1866 election in which the Republicans
achieved veto-proof majorities in both houses of Congress,425
Radical Republicans first moved in January 1867 to impeach
Johnson. Congressman James Ashley of Ohio offered a resolution authorizing the Judiciary Committee to inquire into Johnson’s conduct, and specifically whether he “has been guilty of
acts which are designed or calculated to overthrow, subvert, or
corrupt the Government of the United States, or any department or office thereof,” which would justify impeachment.426
The Judiciary Committee took testimony throughout the month
of February, but was unable to bring its investigation to a conclusion by the time the Thirty-Ninth Congress expired on
March 4.427
Meanwhile, the lame duck Congress passed three significant pieces of legislation. On February 18, Congress passed the
Tenure of Office Act, which substantially limited the president’s power to remove executive branch officers. The Act provided that most Senate-confirmed officers were entitled to remain in office until a replacement was confirmed by the
Senate.428 Certain important officers, however—including the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War—were entitled to remain in office “during the term of the President by whom they
may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject
to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
1887).

The Veto, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 23, 1866, at 1.
REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 208.
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2D SESS. 320 (1867).
See REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 211.
Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, § 1, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867) (repealed
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ate.”429 During a Senate recess, an officer who was “guilty of
misconduct in office, or crime, or for any reason shall become
incapable or legally disqualified to perform its duties” could be
suspended by the president.430 Once the Senate reconvened, it
would have to ratify this suspension and appoint a replacement; if it refused to ratify the suspension, then the suspended
officer must be immediately reinstated.431 Violations of the Act
were made a criminal offense.432
Two days after sending the Tenure of Office Act to the
president, both houses passed the Reconstruction Act. This Act
divided the states of the former Confederacy into five “military
districts,” each to be commanded by an army officer of the rank
of brigadier-general or above.433 Existing state governments
were deemed to be “provisional only,” with the commanding
general having the authority to “abolish, modify, control, or supersede” them when he saw fit.434 The Act also specified the
conditions, including ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, on which the rebellious states would be allowed to return
to Congress.435
Finally, on March 2, Congress passed the Army Appropriations Act, which contained two provisions that went beyond appropriations. First, it required that the headquarters of the
General of the Army be located in Washington—where Congress could keep an eye on it—and that all orders from the
president to the military be issued via the General of the Army,
who could not be dismissed without the consent of the Senate.436 This was meant to transfer power from Johnson to General Grant, who was much preferred by the Republicans in
Congress. Second, the Act disbanded the militias of a number of
former Confederate states.437
On March 2, President Johnson vetoed the Tenure of Office
Act on the unanimous advice of his Cabinet;438 vetoed the Re429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id. § 2.
Id.
Id. §§ 5–6, 9.
Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 428, 428 (1867).
Id. § 6.
Id. § 5.
Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867).
Id. § 6.
DAVID MILLER DEWITT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT
ANDREW JOHNSON, SEVENTEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 202–03
(1967).
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construction Act, which only his Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, urged him to sign;439 and signed the Army Appropriations
Act, while protesting that it both “virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief”
and “denies to ten States of this Union their constitutional
right to protect themselves in any emergency by means of their
own militia.”440 Both of Johnson’s vetoes were overridden that
same day.441
The Fortieth Congress was even more combative, quickly
passing two Supplementary Reconstruction Acts over Johnson’s
veto.442 It was clear by this point that the Republicandominated Congress and the Democratic president were irremediably at loggerheads, and the pattern of their interaction
was relatively fixed. Congress would pass laws providing for
relatively strict Reconstruction measures; President Johnson
would veto them; and Congress would then re-pass the laws
over his veto. Meanwhile, Johnson would use his executive discretion in an attempt to pursue a more lenient Reconstruction,
aimed at fully readmitting the rebellious states as quickly as
possible.
On August 5, 1867, Johnson informed Stanton—the Cabinet member most in line with the congressional vision of Reconstruction—that “[p]ublic considerations of a high character
constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War
will be accepted.”443 Stanton immediately wrote back that “public considerations of a high character . . . constrain me not to
resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of
Congress.”444 One week later, Johnson informed Stanton that,
“[b]y virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are

439. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 209.
440. Andrew Johnson, Special Message to the House of Representatives
(Mar. 2, 1867), in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 472, 472.
441. See Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430, 432 (1867) (reprinting
both the House’s and the Senate’s resolutions overriding the veto); Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429–30 (1867) (same).
442. Supplementary Reconstruction Act, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14 (1867); Supplementary Reconstruction Act, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867).
443. 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 149 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1868) [hereinafter TRIAL].
444. Id.

406

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:347

hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War.”445 Johnson
appointed Grant as Secretary of War ad interim.446 Because
Congress was in recess at the time, this was arguably consistent with the terms of the Tenure of Office Act, so long as Johnson sought the Senate’s approval when it reconvened.447 Nevertheless, the Chicago Tribune thundered that
[t]he country has endured Andrew Johnson as long as endurance can
be counted a virtue. . . . [H]e should be impeached, and ejected from
office, and rendered incapable of holding office hereafter, [and] we
hope that Congress will resolutely take hold of the work at the coming
session, and put him out.448

A Boston newspaper declared that Johnson’s aim was “to throw
the work of reconstruction into the hands of his own friends
and sympathizers at the South and thus to defeat the purpose
of the reconstruction acts in the very process of execution.”449
The paper ominously noted that Johnson “is an obstacle, and he
is in danger of suffering the fate of all obstacles in the way of
the advancement of a nation.”450
Before Congress could reconvene and vent its spleen, however, Republicans were dealt a setback. In the twenty states
holding elections for state offices in November 1867, Republicans “lost significant ground” in eighteen.451 It was a decidedly
dispirited Republican majority that returned to Congress the
next month.452 Nevertheless, the Radicals determined to push
ahead with the impeachment inquiry that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress had begun.453 In late November, the House Judiciary
Committee reported by a one-vote margin in favor of impeaching the president.454 The Committee’s majority report was “injudicious in language, even violent in spirit. Conservatives
pointed to it as evidence that the impeachers were motivated
more out of hatred for Andrew Johnson than concern for the
country’s well-being.”455 In contrast, the report filed by the two
445. Letter from Andrew Johnson to Edwin Stanton (Aug. 12, 1867), in 6
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 583, 583.
446. Id.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 430–31.
448. Editorial, Impeachment, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1867, at 2.
449. Editorial, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 2, 1867, at 2.
450. Editorial, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 3, 1867, at 2.
451. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW
JOHNSON 69 (1973).
452. Id. at 70.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 73.
455. Id. at 74.
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Republicans who voted against impeachment “assumed an air
of moderation.”456 The combination of the electoral repudiation
of the Radicals’ program with the extreme tone of the Radicals’
impeachment report led to a decisive defeat for the impeachment attempt on the House floor on December 7. The Radicals
were unable to muster even a majority of Republican votes, and
the final tally was 57 in favor of impeachment to 108 opposed.457 An editorial in the New York Independent expressed
the Radical reaction:
If the great culprit had robbed a till; if he had fired a barn; if he had
forged a check; he would have been indicted, prosecuted, condemned,
sentenced, and punished. But, as the evidence shows that he only oppressed the negro; that he only conspired with the rebel; that he only
betrayed the Union party; that he only attempted to overthrow the
Republic—of course, he goes unwhipped of justice.458

The editorial went on to lament that “[s]upreme guilt, like innocence itself, is beyond the law’s ax.”459
On January 13, 1868, the Senate refused to concur in
Johnson’s removal of Stanton.460 By the terms of the Tenure of
Office Act, Stanton was immediately reinstated as Secretary of
War.461 Instead, on February 21, Johnson sent Stanton another
note, informing him that he was “hereby removed from office as
Secretary for the Department of War.”462 Johnson appointed
General Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim.463
Congress erupted. By the end of the next day, the Committee
on Reconstruction reported an impeachment resolution to the
House of Representatives.464 The only offenses mentioned in
the resolution were the removal of Stanton and the appointment of Thomas.465 Unlike the previous impeachment attempt,
this time the Republican Party was united in support of impeachment.466 Three days after Johnson removed Stanton from

456. Id. at 75.
457. Id. at 81.
458. Editorial, Impeachment, INDEP. (N.Y.), Dec. 12, 1867, at 4.
459. Id.
460. MCKITRICK, supra note 415, at 501.
461. See supra text accompanying note 431.
462. Letter from Andrew Johnson to Edwin Stanton (Feb. 21, 1868), in 6
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 663, 663.
463. Letter from Andrew Johnson to Lorenzo Thomas (Feb. 21, 1868), in 6
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 352, at 663, 663.
464. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1336 (1868).
465. Id.
466. See BENEDICT, supra note 451, at 104.
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office, the House voted 126 to 47 in favor of impeachment.467 On
March 4, the House presented eleven articles of impeachment
to the Senate.468 The first eight articles all, in varying language, dealt with the firing of Stanton and his replacement by
Thomas.469 The ninth article charged that Johnson told General
Emory that he believed that the provision of the Army Appropriations Act requiring all orders from the president to the military to be issued via the General of the Army was unconstitutional and that Johnson’s intent in doing so was “to induce said
Emory . . . to violate the provisions of said act, and to take and
receive, act upon, and obey such orders as [Johnson] might
make and give.”470 The tenth article alleged that Johnson, in
various “intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues” attempted “to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred,
contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States.”471
The eleventh and final article charged Johnson with disparaging Congress’s legitimacy because it refused to seat representatives of the Southern states, “thereby denying, and intending to
deny, that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory upon him,” as evinced by his failure to obey the Tenure of
Office Act and by his attempt to thwart the Reconstruction Act
and provisions of the Army Appropriations Act.472
In his opening argument to the Senate, Representative
Benjamin Franklin Butler of Massachusetts, one of the House
impeachment managers, thundered:
By murder most foul he succeeded to the Presidency, and is the elect
of an assassin to that high office, and not of the people. . . . [O]ur
frame of government gives us a remedy for such a misfortune . . . . We
can remove him—as we are about to do—from the office he has disgraced by the sure, safe, and constitutional method of impeachment . . . .473

Representative John Logan of Illinois, another impeachment
manager, also drew upon Lincoln’s legacy to Johnson’s detriment:
[T]he heathen philosophers . . . defined a good prince as “one who endeavors to render his subjects happy;” “and a tyrant,” on the contrary,
“one who only aims at his own private advantage.” An example of the

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1400 (1868).
1 TRIAL, supra note 443, at 6–10.
Id. at 6–8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 119.
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first we had in the lamented Lincoln, and of the latter in Mr. Johnson.474

His audience could have been expected to know how the “heathens” dealt with tyrants.
The Senate trial dragged on for several months before the
issue came to a vote on May 16, 1868. Republican Senator
George Williams of Oregon moved that the eleventh article be
voted upon first, presumably because it encompassed many of
the charges contained in the others and therefore “was thought
to be the one that would command the most support for conviction.”475 When the tally was in, thirty-five Senators voted
guilty, nineteen voted not guilty. As this was one guilty vote
shy of the necessary two-thirds supermajority, Johnson was acquitted on this article.476 Williams, obviously flustered, moved
that the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, adjourn for
ten days,477 and this motion passed.478 When the impeachment
court reconvened on May 26, Johnson was acquitted on the
second and third articles, both on identical thirty-five to nineteen votes.479 Upon Williams’s motion, the impeachment court
then adjourned sine die.480 The impeachment court never reconvened, never entered judgment on the remaining eight articles, and never removed Andrew Johnson from office.
Seven Republicans voted to acquit,481 and John F. Kennedy
famously celebrated their courage for doing so.482 In explaining
their votes, these senators argued that Johnson had not violated the Tenure of Office Act,483 but perhaps more important
was a principle expressed by Senator Fessenden of Maine:
The office of President is one of the great co-ordinate branches of the
government, having its defined powers, privileges, and duties; as es-

474. 2 id. at 63.
475. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 233.
476. 2 TRIAL, supra note 443, at 486–87.
477. Id. at 487.
478. Id. at 489.
479. Id. at 496–97.
480. Id. at 497–98.
481. BENEDICT, supra note 451, at 173.
482. JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 126–51 (1956). It is possible
that Kennedy’s celebration was misguided. See DAVID O. STEWART,
IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE FIGHT FOR
LINCOLN’S LEGACY 294 –99 (2009) (arguing that it is “more likely than not”
that at least some Republican Senators were bribed to vote for acquittal).
483. See, e.g., 3 TRIAL, supra note 443, at 195–98 (Senator Fowler explaining why the removal of Stanton did not violate the Act); id. at 301–02 (Senator
Henderson explaining same); id. at 331–33 (Senator Grimes explaining same).
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sential to the very framework of the government as any other. . . . It is
evident, then, as it seems to me, that the offence for which a Chief
Magistrate is removed from office, and the power intrusted to him by
the people transferred to other hands . . . should be of such a character as to commend itself at once to the minds of all right thinking men
as, beyond all question, an adequate cause. It should be free from the
taint of party; leave no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the motives of those who inflict the penalty, and address itself to the country
and the civilized world as a measure justly called for by the gravity of
the crime, and the necessity for its punishment.484

In contrast, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, one of the most
influential of the Radicals, declared the impeachment fight “one
of the last great battles with slavery,”485 and insisted that
Andrew Johnson is the impersonation of the tyrannical slave power.
In him it lives again. He is the lineal successor of John C. Calhoun
and Jefferson Davis . . . . Not to dislodge [Johnson and his supporters]
is to leave the country a prey to one of the most hateful tyrannies of
history.486

Sumner’s colleague Jacob Howard of Michigan declared that
“[m]en and women all over the land hung their heads in shame,
and the wise and reflecting saw in [Johnson] a coarse, designing, and dangerous tyrant.”487
Sumner and many of his colleagues—like Booth and his
confederates—saw their political opponents as tyrants and
therefore saw removing those opponents from the presidency as
a morally justified act. Indeed, as we have seen, Republican
newspapers compared Johnson’s vetoes of Reconstruction legislation to the assassination of Lincoln,488 insisted that he aimed
at overthrowing the Republic,489 and warned darkly that he
was an obstacle to the advancement of a nation.490 And both
the House impeachment managers491 and some of the Senate
Radicals who voted for conviction492 used the language of tyranny to describe Johnson’s actions in office. That is, many of
the Radical Republicans saw Johnson in the same terms in
which Brutus saw Caesar, in which Felton saw Buckingham, in
which the regicides saw Charles, and in which Booth saw Lincoln.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. at 30; see also id. at 328 (Senator Trumbull making a similar point).
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 49.
See supra text accompanying note 420.
See supra text accompanying notes 458–59.
See supra text accompanying note 450.
See supra text accompanying notes 473–74.
See supra text accompanying notes 485–87.
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But like Booth, the Radicals were mistaken. The first eight
articles of impeachment dealt with Johnson’s alleged violations
of the Tenure of Office Act by firing Stanton and appointing
Thomas, and the ninth article dealt with Johnson’s assertions
that the Army Appropriations Act was unconstitutional insofar
as it required Johnson to issue all military orders via the General of the Army, who could only be removed with Senate consent. But these two provisions were almost certainly unconstitutional attempts by Congress to interfere in the internal
workings of the executive branch.493 The president has no obligation to obey an unconstitutional law494—indeed, his oath
would seem to suggest an obligation to defy such a law495—and
therefore violating such a law cannot be an impeachable offense. The tenth article merely accused the president of saying
unpleasant things about Congress. But surely—whether we
want to see this through the lens of the First Amendment or
that of separation of powers—this cannot be an impeachable offense. And the eleventh article was “a potpourri which
. . . lump[ed] together several of the charges contained in the
earlier separate articles.”496 If those earlier articles did not
state an impeachable offense, then neither could the eleventh.
And even if Johnson were wrong about any of these constitutional points, his arguments would still seem to be well within
the bounds of good faith, reasonable disagreement. As Senator

493. In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court concluded that “the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President
from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid.” Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). The Court’s reasoning extends to the relevant provisions of the Army Appropriations Act, as well, and the Court said as much. See
id. at 165–66. Subsequent literature has largely concurred. See, e.g., BERGER,
supra note 4, at 292–98; David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 383, 414 –19 (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in
Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1815–45 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the
President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 295 (1998); see also Seth Barrett Tillman,
The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149,
149–54 (2010) (arguing that one piece of evidence relied upon by supporters of
the Tenure of Office Act does not actually address the removal power at all).
494. See Baude, supra note 350, at 1810 & n.13 (noting “the increasingly
conventional wisdom that the President can or must disregard some or all
laws that he independently believes to be unconstitutional,” and citing expressions of this conventional wisdom).
495. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to swear or
affirm to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”).
496. REHNQUIST, supra note 414, at 227.
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Fessenden suggested, it is hard to characterize a good faith
disagreement as a high crime or misdemeanor.497
Of course, the debates over the Tenure of Office Act, the
Army Appropriations Act, and the president’s intemperate language were not the real sore spots between the president and
his congressional critics. The allegations in the impeachment
articles were merely the epiphenomenal manifestations of the
deeper dispute over the proper course of Reconstruction and the
aftermath of the Civil War. As Representative James Blaine,
who voted for impeachment, put it years later in his autobiography:
The sober reflection of later years has persuaded many who favored
Impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges made, and
that its success would have resulted in greater injury to free institutions than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.
No impartial reader can examine the record of the pleadings and arguments of the Managers who appeared on behalf of the House, without feeling that the President was impeached for one set of misdemeanors, and tried for another series.498

In short, it was Johnson’s and the Radical Republicans’ “deep
commitment to opposing, honestly held views which set them
on a collision course.”499 But if policy disagreements—even deep
disagreements over crucially important issues—were to be
grounds for impeachment, then the United States would have
moved a long way towards a parliamentary, rather than a presidential, system.500 The president is not meant to be a “mere
creature of the Legislature,” as George Mason insisted at the
Philadelphia Convention.501 Indeed, as we have seen, it was
precisely such a concern that led the Convention to reject “maladministration” as a category of impeachable offenses.502 In
short, in David Currie’s words: “[N]o one should be impeached
because he disagrees with the congressional will.”503

497. See supra text accompanying note 484.
498. 2 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO
GARFIELD 376 (Norwich, Conn., Henry Bill 1886).
499. BERGER, supra note 4, at 264.
500. Even those commentators who would prefer a more parliamentary
style of governance do not think that the Constitution actually creates such a
system. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
114 –21 (2006) (lamenting the fact that the Constitution does not allow for the
removal of “merely” incompetent presidents).
501. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 86.
502. See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.
503. Currie, supra note 493, at 452.
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But if Sumner and his colleagues were like Booth in that
they made a substantive mistake, they were decidedly unlike
him in their avoidance of epistemic hubris. Booth’s mistake led
to tragedy because he acted on it in an irreversible way. The
Radical Republicans’ mistake had no such dire consequences,
for they allowed the Constitution’s proceduralized alternative
to assassination to run its course. And their epistemically
humble appeal to procedure allowed for the triumph of substantive justice, despite their mistake. Johnson may not have
been a very good president, but neither had he committed an
assassinable offense. Under the American constitutional
scheme, he did not deserve to be removed—and the impeachment procedures laid out in that scheme, by demanding a supermajority for conviction and by impressing on Senators the
grave nature of their task, enabled the Senate to get the Johnson impeachment trial substantively right.
As we shall see in the next Part, the same procedures also
allowed the Senate to reach the right outcome in the only other
presidential impeachment trial in American history.
IV. BILL CLINTON AND ANN COULTER
In 1998, the conservative provocateur Ann Coulter made
waves when she wrote that, once it was established that President Clinton did, in fact, lie under oath, the only debate should
be “about whether to impeach or assassinate.”504 After expressing outrage in 2006 over a faux documentary portraying the fictional assassination of then-President George W. Bush, Coulter
was asked on a television news show to reconcile her outrage
with her earlier statement about Clinton. She explained her
earlier statement thus:
[I]n my [1998] book, High Crimes and Misdemeanors [sic], [I was] describing the entire history of impeachment, which we got from the
British. I explained how we changed it here in America. In Britain, it
was a criminal punishment. You would be—one of the punishments
was hanging. Here it was purely losing your office. At the end of this,
I said . . . . I said the only question, if we were a decent country or
something to that effect, would be whether to impeach or assassinate,
not whether to impeach or not . . . .505

504. ANN H. COULTER, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE CASE
AGAINST BILL CLINTON 107 (1998).
505. Hannity and Colmes: Interview with Ann Coulter, Doug Schoen (Fox
News television broadcast Aug. 31, 2006), transcript available at 2006 WLNR
15140850.
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Coulter was not entirely wrong. There is, as we have seen, an
intimate relationship between impeachment and assassination.
Coulter seems to take this to mean that any offense she considers impeachable in the present day would have been assassinable in a former time. But this gets the causality backwards. Rather, if we are to take the link between impeachment and
assassination seriously, we should use assassinability as a
benchmark for impeachability. On this view, it is precisely the
fact that it was unimaginable to justify Clinton’s assassination,
given his conduct, that made it unsuitable for impeachment.
The facts, in brief, are these:506 In November 1995, President Clinton began a sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky, then
a White House intern.507 The relationship continued through
May 1997.508 During the course of the relationship, Lewinsky
confided in her friend Linda Tripp, who, in mid-1997, began
keeping detailed notes and tape recordings of her phone conversations with Lewinsky.509 Tripp disclosed the affair to attorneys for Paula Jones, who was suing Clinton for sexual harassment; on December 5, 1997, Lewinsky’s name was added to
Jones’s witness list.510 On December 17, Clinton informed Lewinsky that she was on the witness list; the president suggested
that she offer to sign an affidavit in lieu of a deposition.511 He
also reviewed with her their “cover story”—that Lewinsky’s
West Wing visits were to the president’s secretary, Betty Currie, not to the president.512 On December 19, Jones’s lawyers
subpoenaed Lewinsky to appear for a deposition in lateJanuary; the subpoena also directed her to produce any gifts
that Clinton had given her.513 Lewinsky informed the president
of the subpoena and suggested that she arrange to have Currie
hold on to the gifts that Clinton had given her.514 Later that
506. For the purposes of this section, I rely on the facts as laid out by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. See generally KENNETH W. STARR, REFERRAL
FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998) [hereinafter
STARR REPORT]. As Judge Posner has noted, President Clinton’s attorneys
“made relatively little effort to rebut the strictly factual allegations” made by
Starr. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 16 n.1 (1999).
507. STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 27–28.
508. Id. at 62.
509. Id. at 13; POSNER, supra note 506, at 22–24.
510. STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 88.
511. Id. at 94.
512. Id. at 95.
513. Id. at 96.
514. Id. at 101.
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day, Currie picked up a box containing the gifts that Clinton
had given Lewinsky.515
On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky signed an affidavit stating
that she had never had a sexual relationship with the president.516 On January 17, President Clinton was deposed by
Jones’s lawyers. Much of the questioning involved Lewinsky,
and Clinton claimed that he was unable to remember many of
the details of his interactions with her. He “emphatically denied” having a sexual relationship with her.517 The next day, he
spoke with Currie and asked her a number of leading questions, including, “You were always there when [Lewinsky] was
there, right?” and, “Monica came on to me, and I never touched
her, right?”518
Unbeknownst to Clinton, Tripp had earlier in January
turned over her notes and tapes to Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel investigating allegations that the Clintons had
committed crimes in conjunction with their investment in the
Whitewater real estate development in the early 1980s.519 The
day before Jones’s lawyers deposed Clinton, Starr obtained authorization to expand his investigation to cover possible obstruction of justice in the Jones case.520 In late-July, shortly after Clinton’s motion for summary judgment in the Jones case
was granted,521 Lewinsky signed an immunity agreement with
the Independent Counsel’s Office and began cooperating with
its investigation, including making statements and turning
over physical evidence.522 The next month, Clinton testified before the grand jury convened by the Independent Counsel. He
acknowledged having an affair with Lewinsky but claimed that
he had not lied in his deposition in the Jones case because the
acts he admitted to were not, in his view, covered by the definition of “sexual relations” he was given.523 He denied having encouraged Lewinsky to lie in the Jones case; he denied having
sent Currie to retrieve the gifts he had given Lewinsky; and he
denied having tried to convince Currie to lie for him.524
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 107–10.
Id. at 116–18.
Id. at 118.
POSNER, supra note 506, at 24 –25.
Id. at 25–26.
Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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In September 1998, Starr reported to the House of Representatives that he found “substantial and credible information
supporting . . . eleven possible grounds for impeachment.”525
The first ten grounds involved lying under oath, obstructing
justice, and witness tampering in the Jones case and before the
Independent Counsel’s grand jury.526 The final ground alleged
that Clinton had abused his constitutional power by lying to
the public, the grand jury, and Congress; by promising to cooperate with the grand jury investigation and then breaking that
promise; and by invoking executive privilege.527 On October 8,
1998, the House authorized the Judiciary Committee to begin
an impeachment inquiry.528 The Committee put eighty-one
questions to Clinton, which he answered in writing, under
oath.529 The Committee majority determined that his answers
to those questions “follow[ed] the pattern of selective memory,
reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, artful distortions, outright lies and half truths he had already used.”530
In December 1998, the Judiciary Committee reported out
four articles of impeachment.531 The first accused Clinton of
perjury before the Independent Counsel’s grand jury, and the
second accused him of perjury in the Jones civil case.532 The
third accused him of obstructing justice by suborning perjury
and tampering with witnesses in both the Jones case and the
Independent Counsel investigation.533 And the fourth article alleged that Clinton abused his power by perjuring himself in his
answers to the Judiciary Committee’s questions.534 Less than
two weeks later, the House of Representatives approved the
first and third articles (alleging perjury before the grand jury
and obstruction of justice), but rejected the other two.535 On
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

STARR REPORT, supra note 506, at 129.
Id. at 131–203.
Id. at 204 –10.
H.R. Res. 581, 105th Cong. (1998).
The questions and answers are reprinted in H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 400–40 (Comm. Print 1998)
[hereinafter JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT].
530. Id. at 32; see also POSNER, supra note 506, at 30 (concluding that Clinton told a number of lies in his answers to the Judiciary Committee).
531. The Committee’s recommended impeachment articles are reprinted in
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 529, at 1–5.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
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February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted Clinton on both articles, with forty-five members voting guilty on the article alleging perjury before the grand jury and fifty members voting
guilty on the article alleging obstruction of justice,536 both well
shy of the sixty-seven votes necessary for conviction.
After reviewing the evidence compiled by the Independent
Counsel, Judge Posner concluded that it was “clear beyond a
reasonable doubt” that Clinton had committed federal crimes
that would normally yield a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven
months.537 But, of course, whether Clinton committed a criminal offense is wholly different from whether he committed an
impeachable offense. Obviously, Coulter538—and indeed, many
others—thought he did, and their reasons are telling. House
Republican Whip Tom Delay, for example, declared that the
impeachment proceedings presented
a debate about relativism versus absolute truth. The President’s defenders have said that the President is morally reprehensible, that he
is reckless, that he has violated the trust of the American people, lessened their esteem for the office of President and dishonored the office
which they have entrusted him, but that it does not rise to the level of
impeachment . . . . I cannot in good conscience [agree].539

Proponent after proponent of impeachment and conviction
echoed the claim that the president had diminished the office.
Representative Christopher Cox insisted that impeachment
was necessary so that the nation could “once again respect the
institution of the presidency.”540 In the Senate, Richard Lugar
insisted that
[o]ur President must be strong because a President personifies the
rule of law that he is sworn to uphold and protect. We must believe
him and trust him if we are to follow him. His influence on domestic
and foreign policies comes from that trust, which a lifetime of words,
deeds, and achievements has built. President Clinton has betrayed
that trust.541

His colleagues echoed these sentiments, insisting that the
president ought to have good character542 and worrying about
what effect Clinton’s conduct would have on “the moral health
536. 145 CONG. REC. 2376–77 (1999).
537. POSNER, supra note 506, at 54 –55.
538. See supra text accompanying note 504.
539. 144 CONG. REC. 28,041 n.2 (1998).
540. Id. at 28,043.
541. 145 CONG. REC. 2395 (1999).
542. See id. at 2421–22 (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici); id. at 2541
(statement of Sen. Sam Brownback); id. at 2543 (remarks of Sen. John Ashcroft); id. at 2561 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
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of the Nation.”543 Senator Frist was concerned that Clinton’s
conduct would “corrode the respect we all have for the Office of
President,”544 and Senator Grassley lamented “the collapse of
the President’s moral authority.”545 And Senator Hagel insisted
that “President Clinton’s conduct has debased his office and violated the soul of justice—truth. He has thereby debased and
violated the American people.”546
Impeachment supporters in the press made similar arguments. Conservative commentator William Bennett declared,
“Bill Clinton is a reproach. He has defiled the office of the presidency . . . .”547 The New York Post declared that Clinton “has
debased his office,”548 and the Las Vegas Review Journal suggested that the president’s “whimper[ing]” during the whole affair suggested that “one more article should be added to that
referral. The Constitution allows the office of the presidency to
be occupied only by an adult.”549 The Columbus Dispatch insisted that Clinton “has soiled the honorable office to which he
was elected by the people.”550 And the Daily Oklahoman solemnly intoned, “More than ever, America needs leaders who
will stand for righteousness.”551
There is a certain irony in the arguments marshaled by the
advocates of impeachment and conviction. They were concerned
that Clinton made the office too small—that he lessened the esteem in which it was held, that he destroyed public respect for
and trust in the presidency, that he “debased” and “defiled” it.
But a focus on impeachability as assassinability allows us to
see that this concern was precisely backwards. Caesar and
Charles were assassinable because they attempted to make
their offices too big. They assumed to themselves despotic powers inconsistent with the constitutional order. They were ty543. Id. at 2443 (statement of Sen. James Inhofe).
544. Id. at 2450.
545. Id. at 2524.
546. Id. at 2565.
547. BENNETT, supra note 27, at 5.
548. Editorial, Forget Censure: Impeachment is Censure, N.Y. POST, Dec.
11, 1998, at 42, available at 1998 WLNR 6585684.
549. Editorial, Carefully Crafted, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 13, 1998, at 2D,
available at 1998 WLNR 518008, quoted in Impeachment: The Editorials; Excerpts from Opinions by U.S. Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A28,
available at 1998 WLNR 2805414.
550. Editorial, To Impeach? House Vote Will Test Nation’s Character,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 1998, at 2B, available at 1998 WLNR 7571258.
551. Editorial, Impeach Bill Clinton, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 15, 1998, at 4.

2010]

IMPEACHMENT AND ASSASSINATION

419

rants, which is to say that they reduced their formerly free
countrymen to the status of slaves. They waged wars—and not
just “culture wars”—against their own people. Even the arguments against Lincoln and Johnson—though mistaken—were
that they usurped authority not properly belonging to them.
Clinton was not properly impeachable because there was no
credible allegation that he did any such thing. Diminishment or
debasement of the office may render one a bad president, unworthy of reelection or of the approbation of history. But it is
not assassinable, and therefore not impeachable—and, once
again, the procedural safeguards of the Constitution led to the
correct result.552
This is, however, not to suggest that “purely private” conduct by the president (if it is even truly possible for a sitting
president to engage in “purely private” conduct) could never
form the basis for an impeachable offense. Judge Posner offers
the following hypothetical: suppose that President Clinton, “using none of the resources of his office and so being innocent of
any misuse of Presidential power, had killed Monica Lewinsky
with his bare hands in order to prevent her from cooperating
with the Independent Counsel.”553 Surely, Posner concludes,
this would be impeachable, for “Americans will not be ruled by
a Nero or a Caligula.”554 Indeed, and it bears noting that Caligula was assassinated,555 and Nero committed suicide facing
assassination556—history of which the Founding generation
was well aware.557 In fact, even sexual misconduct could rise to
the level of the assassinable. It was the rape of Lucretia by Sextus Tarquinius, the son of the king Tarquinius Superbus, that
convinced Junius Brutus and Publius Valerius to lead the revolt against the Tarquin monarchy and establish the Roman
Republic,558 a story that, as we have seen, was well known to
552. See GERHARDT, supra note 13, at 175 (“Of those thirty-eight senators
who published statements on their reasons for voting not guilty on both articles, more than half—twenty-seven—explained that they did not regard the
misconduct alleged in either article of impeachment approved by the House as
constituting an impeachable offense.”).
553. POSNER, supra note 506, at 105.
554. Id.
555. See GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE TWELVE CAESARS 180–82
(Michael Grant ed., Robert Graves trans., Penguin Classics 2003).
556. See id. at 242–45.
557. See RICHARD, supra note 104, at 88–90 (citing numerous examples
from the Founding era of references to Nero and Caligula).
558. See LIVY, THE HISTORY OF ROME: BOOKS 1–5, at 79–83 (Valerie M.
Warrior trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2006).
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the Founding generation.559 The unbridled pursuit of personal
interest by those in power is a hallmark of tyranny.560 Franklin
and his compatriots believed in the justness of the assassinations of Caligula and the Tarquins (and the attempted assassination of Nero), as much as they believed in the justness of the
killing of Caesar and Charles. All of those cases involved aggrandizement of the office, whether for political or personal
reasons. There is simply no reason to believe that Clinton’s behavior did, and that is why—with the exception of a few people
like Ann Coulter—it seems grossly disproportionate to even
think of justifying assassination in Clinton’s case. And for that
reason, the Senate was right to acquit him.
CONCLUSION
Ann Coulter was correct561 that, in British law, impeachment could—and not infrequently did—carry the death penalty.562 The American Constitution consciously broke with this
tradition563 by declaring that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or
Profit under the United States.”564 But this change did not
wholly sever the connection between impeachment and death.
Under the American Constitution, impeachment is political
559. See supra text accompanying notes 102–04.
560. Indeed, this helps to explain the Constitution’s pairing of “Bribery”
along with “Treason” and “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as impeachable offenses. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The public official paying a bribe (either
to voters or to other public officials) is looking to extend his influence via extra-constitutional mechanisms—much as Caesar and Buckingham had used
patronage to consolidate their offices. See supra text accompanying notes 57,
60–61, 135, 180, 214–18. And the public official receiving a bribe is, in effect,
announcing that the state apparatus exists to serve his personal ends. That is,
he is announcing some version of, L’état, c’est moi. Corruption and tyranny are
thus tightly linked, as republican thinkers well understood. See BAILYN, supra
note 117, at 330 (“[I]t was obvious that the ideological origins of the American
Revolution had been rooted not merely in a general fear of power but specifically in the belief that liberty could not survive where corruptible men wielded
the apparatus of a powerful national state.” (emphasis added)); Josh Chafetz,
Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of
Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 182–83, 230–33 (2008) (noting that republican theory requires political actors to pursue the public good, rather than
private interest).
561. See supra text accompanying note 505.
562. See BERGER, supra note 4, at 70, 82.
563. See id. at 58.
564. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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death.565 Indeed, it can even be political death without possibility of resurrection, should the Senate choose to exercise its authority to make disqualification to future office a penalty upon
conviction. Benjamin Franklin drew attention to this link in
the Philadelphia Convention, when he highlighted the role of
presidential impeachability as a means of avoiding presidential
assassination.566
This Article has attempted to unpack Franklin’s enigmatic
and provocative statement. It suggests that the Constitution
maintains the link between impeachment and death insofar as
assassinability provides the substantive criterion for presidential impeachability. The link is severed, however, insofar as the
Constitution attempts to preclude actual assassination by proceduralizing the removal of the chief magistrate. Impeachment
and conviction lead to political death, but no more—procedure
tames blood lust.
This Article looked to Caesar and Charles I to understand
both the substantive criteria for, and the procedural problems
with, the assassination of an “obnoxious” (to use Franklin’s
word) chief magistrate. It then used this analysis to develop
substantive criteria for impeachment and to explain the procedural virtues of the Constitution’s impeachment process, virtues that were highlighted in the correct results of the only two
presidential impeachment trials in American history, and virtues that were obviously and sorely lacking in John Wilkes
Booth’s decision to circumvent impeachment procedures.567

565. But see supra note 23 (providing a caveat).
566. See supra text accompanying note 1.
567. A proper appreciation for the virtues of American impeachment procedure might also lead us to be suspicious of other legal rules that have the effect of incentivizing assassination. The current presidential succession regime,
in which the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate
are third and fourth in line to the presidency, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006), does create
such perverse incentives when the Speaker or President pro tempore is from a
different party than the President. Cabinet officer succession, which would ensure party continuity, would thus both eliminate constitutional problems with
the succession regime, see generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar,
Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995)
(answering the question posed in their title in the negative because members of
Congress are not “Officer[s]” as required by Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of
the U.S. Constitution), and decrease the incentive for presidential assassination.
Of course, the current presidential succession regime also increases the
incentives for impeachment—after all, the leaders of the impeaching and adjudicating houses move closer to the presidency if the President is removed—
but the supermajority requirement for conviction makes such an impeachment
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But it may perhaps be objected that the analysis presented
here proves too much. Having argued that the two presidential
impeachment trials rightly ended in acquittal, the question
naturally arises: Would any American president have been
properly impeachable on this view? Although a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, I submit that Richard Nixon
was. The three articles of impeachment adopted by the House
Judiciary Committee charged him with obstruction of justice
with regard to the Watergate break-in; using federal agencies
(including the FBI and the IRS) to spy on, harass, and intimidate his political enemies; and defying congressional subpoenas
in the course of the impeachment inquiry.568 The Watergate
break-in was not some piece of petty burglary—it was a raid on
the offices of the Democratic National Committee “for the purpose of securing political intelligence,” in the words of the impeachment articles.569 By participating in the cover-up, Nixon
made himself party to an attempt by his allies to use the levers
of power to keep him in power. Likewise, the allegation that
Nixon used federal agencies to go after his political enemies involved the use of power in an attempt to entrench power.
Viewed this way, Nixon’s behavior has less in common with
Clinton’s—despite the superficial similarity of both being
charged with obstruction of justice—and more in common with
the First Triumvirate’s attempts to consolidate its power570 and
Charles’s attempts to circumvent institutions meant to check
royal power.571 Nixon, like Caesar and Charles, sought to aggrandize his office, arrogating to himself new powers and using
them to entrench himself in office. His vision of the presidency
was too big, not too small.572 Nixon’s behavior was constitutionsubversive—and therefore tyrannical—in a way that neither
Johnson’s nor Clinton’s was.
As we have seen, it is this conception of tyranny, arising
out of the subversion of the constitution and the accompanying
destruction of republican liberty, that the Founding generation
unlikely. It would be quite difficult to muster two-thirds of the Senate for
purely partisan purposes.
568. IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305 (1974).
569. Id. at 2.
570. See supra text accompanying notes 62–65.
571. See supra text accompanying notes 236–41.
572. Especially telling in this vein is his claim that “when the President
does it, that means that it is not illegal.” Excerpts from Interview with Nixon
About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16.
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regarded as substantively justifying assassination. But assassination was disruptive at best and counterproductive at worst.
Moreover, the Founders were deeply aware of individuals’ cognitive limitations. They sought a less disruptive, more epistemically humble means of removing obnoxious chief executives
than assassination, and they created one in the constitutional
process of impeachment.

